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The first essay addresses how investors price risk in the stock market when they
cannot observe the true long-run growth rate of their consumption and dividend
endowments. The model presents a number of import insights into how the abil-
ity of long-run risks to explain the equity risk premium is directly related to the
quality of investors information sets. The second essay addresses the welfare costs
of ambiguity surrounding the probability distribution of shocks driving the growth
rate of their consumption endowment. If an investor faces both long-run risk and
rare disasters in their consumption edowment, then they would forgoe a large share
of their lifetime consumption to absolve ambiguity surrounding disasters, but sub-
stantially less to remove ambiguity about long-run risk. The third essay presents
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy (SOE)
that faces time-varying volatility of news about their total factor productivity and
real interest rate. News uncertainty shocks about the interest rate motivate the
SOE to deleverage, however, the same class of shocks in total factor productivity
have insubstantial effects.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1
I present three essays which jointly highlight what happens to asset prices
when investors information sets and/or beleifs are somehow flawed. They focus on
three epsitemological situations faced by investors considering risk: can’t see, don’t
know, and not sure. In the first essay, investors can’t see the true growth rate, and
therefore make their best inference given their information sets. This turns a pop-
ular result driving the equity premium upside down. In the second essay, investors
don’t know the true distribution of risk. They make a constrained-pessimistic best
guess, and this reveals that the risk of a rare bad event is much more costly than
a more probable (but smaller) bad event that persists for a long time. The third
essay focuses on when investors are not sure about how much uncertainty there
is about future events. This leads to substantial fluctations in economic aggre-
gates in response to changing quantities of news risk. Taken together, these essays
underline the importance of information in asset price formation.
The first essay is in Chapter 2, which presents a model of the equity risk
premium. Investors price the stock market with imperfect information. The inter-
esting trade-off in the model is how the quality of investors’ information impacts
the equilibrium price of risk. As the quality of information deteriorates, the price
of risk for shocks impacting investors’ marginal utility shrinks toward zero, dimin-
ishing the risk premium on the stock market. Further, the model matches features
of time-varying disagreement observed in data from professional forecasters. As
volatility of key economic aggregates changes over time, so does the cross-sectional
dispersion of investors forecasts.
These results are best motivated at a more granular level. The economy is
populated with many investors, each having identical risk preferences. Individual
investors have a consumption endowment that grows at exactly the same rate as
2
aggregate consumption. The stock market pays out the aggregate dividend in
every period. Consumption and dividend growth are linked by a small, persistent
process that jointly drives their conditional mean growth rates. Shocks to this
process are known as long-run risks. If investors in the model had full information,
long-run risks could generate a price of risk sufficient to explain the historical
equity risk premium in the United States. But investors cannot directly observe
the true growth rate, and instead have a noisy signal providing some information
about the truth. There is no arbitrage in the economy, meaning each investor
correctly prices the stock market in expectation. Further, it’s common knowledge
that investors form model consistent expectations. Taken together, these facts
imply that average expectations of growth are what drive asset prices over time.
These average expectations are otherwise known as higher order expectations.
Investors infer average expectations with the Kalman filter. They use their
private signals in combination with publicly observable data on asset prices and
economic aggregates to forecast the hidden values of average expectations. In
equilibrium, the cross-sectional average of investors’ forecasts of average expecta-
tions pins down the law of motion for average expectations. And these average
expectations are the state variables that drive asset prices.
As the noise in investors’ signals grows large, the equilibrium compensation
for bearing long-run risk approaches zero. The equity risk premium shrinks. The
Kalman filter estimates of average expectations are equivalent to investors’ beliefs.
And as input quality to the filter deteriorates, investors perception of physical risk
is smoothed over time. Therefore the perceived quantity of risk falls, hence so
do risk premia. The filter also matches the time-varying dispersion of forecasts
observed in the data: during bad economic times, forecasts of consumption and
3
dividend growth fan out. And in good times, forecasts condense. Investor beliefs
are functions of volatility. When volatility is high, the cross-sectional dispersion
of beliefs spread out.
Chapter 3 presents a model of a representative agent who faces long-run risks
and rare disasters in their consumption endowment. However, the agent does not
know the true probability distribution of these risks. Futher, they have concerns
for robustness: whatever model the agent operationalizes should be reasonably
pessimistic given they do not know the truth. Thus, the agent seeks to construct
a model of consumption growth that simultaneously addresses both model uncer-
tainty and physical risk. The agent solves this problem by choosing the worst
case probability distribution for long-run risks and rare disasters subject to an
entropy constraint: the resulting worst-cast distributions must be hard to reject
given the observed data. With the solution in hand, I ask how much lifetime con-
sumption would the agent give up to resolve ambiguity surrounding the risks in
the endowment. For every level of risk aversion, the agent would pay a substan-
tially larger share of their lifetime consumption to resolve ambiguity surrounding
disasters relative to long-run risk.
Chapter 4 presents a model of a small open economy (SOE) facing time-varying
uncertainty in news about their total factor productivity and real borrowing costs.
An unanticipated change in the volatility of news is called a news uncertainty
shock. When facing a positive news uncertainty shock about borrowing costs, the
SOE responds by reducing its consumption and deleveraging external debt. When
facing a similar shock for total factor productivity, the response of macroeconomic
aggregates is small and negligible.
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CHAPTER 2
DISAGREEMENT OVER THE LONG-RUN: THE EFFECTS OF
HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS ON THE EQUITY RISK
PREMIUM
5
2.1 Introduction
The historically large return premium on risky stocks over safe bonds observed in
the U.S. is an equilibrium outcome resulting from a large population of investors
trading on their subjective views of asset prices and the state of the economy.
Data suggests market participants hold consistently diverse beliefs about the an-
ticipated trajectories of key economic aggregates important to asset prices. For
instance, the Survey of Professional Forecasters exhibits large dispersion in ex-
pectations about the future path of real consumption. Yet the extant literature
on the equity premium neglects targeting the observed level of disagreement in
the data, or how disagreement evolves over the business cycle. In light of these
facts, I contribute a novel consumption-based asset pricing model able to match
import features of both the time series moments of asset prices in addition to the
conditional cross-sectional moments of belief dispersion. In the model, investors
have private information about the conditional mean growth rate of the economy.
They use their private information in combination with publicly available data
on prices and key aggregates to optimally form subjective forecasts of economic
growth. In equilibrium, the model produces an important feature of belief disper-
sion observed in the data–that investors’ forecasts tend to have greater dispersion
during bad times for economic growth when uncertainty is highest. Further, the
model shows that the size of compensation for risks tied to long-run economic
growth is increasing in how precisely agents’ discern the true state of the economy.
If agents’ largely disagree about economic growth, then the associated risk premia
is small and inconsequential to asset returns. The model also exhibits endogenous
countercyclical compensation for risks tied to long-run economic growth, matching
the well established countercylicality of the equity premium borne out in the data.
6
I assume agents in the model cannot perfectly observe the conditional mean
growth rate of their ex post identical consumption and dividend endowments. The
stochastic processes driving the endowments are akin to the long-run risks model of
Bansal and Yaron [2004] and Bansal et al. [2012]. The special feature of a long-run
risks endowment is the conditional expected growth rates of both consumption and
dividends are commonly driven by small, persistent, and mean-revering process.
This feature portrays aggregate consumption and dividends as tending to weather
sustained periods of above and below average growth throughout the business cycle.
The shocks driving the conditional mean growth rate are what generate the large
equity premium in a full-information long-run risks model. I refer to these shocks
as long-run news. In my model, agents privately observe noisy signals obscuring
the true conditional mean growth rate, in addition to publicly available price and
economic data. In order for private information to play an important role in the
the model, the time-series evolution of observable prices and economic aggregates
cannot fully reveal the state of the conditional expected growth rate. Such a feature
can be justified by the thinking of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. They posit that
if information is costly to acquire, then prices, even if freely observed, cannot fully
reveal all relevant information. Despite agents in the model not observing the
true growth rate, rational expectations of its law of motion is common knowledge
amongst agents. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, agents are forced into a
situation first described by Townsend [1983] and Sargent [1991] where they must,
“...forecast the forecast of others...” in order to evaluate statistical expectations of
future states in the economy. In equilibrium, the consequence of agents’ private
information, rational expectations, and no arbitrage is the emergence of higher
order expectations. That is, the average forecast of the average forecast becomes
a state variable in the model relevant to asset prices. I employ the technique for
7
solving rational expectations models with private information devloped in Nimark
[2011] to solve the model. Common knowledge of rational expectations of the true
state is sufficient to pin down a stochastic process for higher order expectations.
Agents use Bayesian methods to estimate the expectations hiearchy, which, in turn,
also serve as the law of motion for the hierarchy. This realization underlies all of
the interesting results.
The first main result is the model can generate a countercyclical risk price for
long-run news. That is, the price agents would pay to hedge long-run shocks in
their stochastic discount factors changes with economic conditions. This is a stark
contrast to the full information model, where the risk price for long-run news in the
full information model is constant and large. The result can best be understood
by first noting the endowment process for all agents in the model is subject to
common heteroskedastic shocks. If the scale of noise in agents’ private signals
is constant over the business cycle, then the precision of agents’ signals increases
when volatility is high. Therefore, in the aggregate, information about the long-run
growth prospects of the economy improves during spells of high volatility–agents’
effectively improve their collective forecast accuracy of the conditional mean growth
rate. This mechanical feature of the model captures the intuition in the empirical
work of Loh and Stulz [2015] that shows market participants’ earnings forecasts
are relatively more accurate during spells of high volatility. They argue this result
in the data stems from agents’ career concerns, which drive them to work harder
during during bad times.
The second main result is the risk price for long-run news is decreasing in the
scale of noise clouding investors’ perceptions of the true state: the more agents’
heterogeneous information sets disagree about growth, the lower the premium for
8
long-run risk. The intuition behind a shrinking risk price is, in equilibrium, asset
prices are less responsive to news about the state of the economy when noise
inhibits agents’ ability to percieve the true state. Risk prices directly inherit this
property of actual asset prices. Further, when the scale of noise is large relative
to the time series volatility of long-run news, about three to four times larger,
then the risk price for long-run shocks is small and insubstantial. Likewise, asset
returns also grow less sensitive to long-run news when noise is relatively high. In
a nutshell, if agents’ information sets are too disparate, even a strong distaste for
shocks to long-run growth cannot explain the equity premium.
The model is also capable of generating time-varying cross-sectional disagree-
ment in agents’ consumption growth forecasts that matches features of the data.
A simple exercise of partitioning the real consumption growth panel from the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters into recession and expansion regimes, periods when
volatility is relatively low and high, shows the interquartile range of consumption
growth forecasts is 1.28% during expansions relative to 1.70% in recessions. After
a recent spell of high volatility, agents prior uncertainty about the state increases,
which drives the larger cross-sectional dispersion in forecasts relative to times when
volatility has been low or normal. This feature permits the model to flexibly target
moments of data from real market participants that measure belief heterogeneity.
Models of heterogeneous beliefs are notoriously difficult to calibrate, and the lion’s
share of such models therefore result in stylized theories with at most a handful of
agents. A plausible (and exciting) next step in this research agenda is to incorpo-
rate measures of trading volume, and to therefore produce an asset pricing model
that jointly explains conditional moments of the time series of returns, measures
of heterogeneous beliefs, and trading activity.
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Perhaps the theoretical foundation for heterogeneous beliefs in asset pricing
stems sprouts from Harrison and Kreps [1978]. They formulate a dynamic economy
populated by risk neutral traders set apart from one another by their differences
in beliefs about the cash flows of a risky asset. If short sales of the risky asset
are prohibited, speculative behavior arises: traders are willing to pay a premium
above and beyond the price that would otherwise induce them to hold the risky
asset forevermore. The premium exists because of other traders’ willingness to
pay higher prices, contingent, of course, on their relative optimism. Varian [1985]
extends the application of heterogeneous beliefs to risk averse agents operating in
a complete market. He shows, again supposing agents have homogeneous prefer-
ences, that asset prices tend to be lower when agents’ beliefs are more dispersed.
Using the theoretical chasis of Detemple and Murthy [1994], Zapatero [1998] poses
a situation where two agents with logarithmic utility have heterogeneous beliefs
about aggregate consumption growth. He finds that differences in beliefs largely
increase the volatility of the real interest rate. Basak [2005] presents a continuous
time economy where risk averse agents can disagree on the mean of consump-
tion growth. If the agents’ preferences are homogeneous, the relative optimism
(pessimism) of a particular agent amplifies their degree of risk sharing. If the dis-
agreement process is correlated with agents consumption, new risk premia terms
enter the model alongside the traditional compensation for uncertain consumption
flows. Recent work by Albagli et al. [2015] shows diverse beliefs held by Bayesian
agents creates a wedge in the way asset prices respond to innovations in state vari-
ables. Barillas and Nimark [2016a] study an economy where agents’ higher order
expectations drive a speculative component of bond yields that is orthogonal to
the traditional component of yields driven by common risk factors. Barillas and
Nimark [2016b] etend their theory with an empirical affine term structure model
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with higher order expectations that is able to match the cross-sectional dispersion
in forecast data of long-term bond yields.
The paper closest to this one is Bhandari [2016]. He reverse-engineers hetero-
geneous beliefs by recasting the incomplete markets asset pricing model of Con-
stantinides and Duffie [1996] with idiosyncratic risk into a complete markets model
with heterogeneous beliefs. The data generating process for idiosyncratic consump-
tion is interpreted as a data generating process for likelihood ratios that distort
individual agents’ beliefs. A key difference from my paper is there is no private
information in the model–agents’ beliefs are driven by a carefully chosen exogenous
process that satisfies desirable aggregation conditions.
Section 2 discusses the model in detail. Second 3 refers to how I calibrate the
model. Section 4 discusses resuts, and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model
Time is discrete, indexed by t ∈ N. There is a continuum of islands i ∈ (0, 1), and
each island i is populated by one infinitely lived investor with identical preferences
of Epstein and Zin [1989] and Weil [1989]. Investor i maximizes her lifetime utility
over real consumption flows Ci,t subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
Vi,t = max
{Ci,t}
(
(1− β)C1−1/ψi,t + βEi,t
[
V 1−γi,t+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
(2.1)
subject to,
Wi,t+1 = Rc,t+1
(
Wi,t − Ci,t
)
(2.2)
Investors accumulate real wealth Wi,t and save with an asset that yields the return
on the aggregate consumption claim Rc,t+1. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) models
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investors’ time preference, ψ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substituion
(EIS), and γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. I define ϑ ≡ 1−γ
1−1/ψ
to simplify notation when solving the model. Importantly, when ψ > 1 investors
prefer the early resolution of uncertainty, and when ψ < 1, investors would rather
wait until uncertainty is resolved in the future.
Aggregate log consumption growth4ct+1 and log dividend growth4dt+1 follow
exogenous stochastic processes:
xt+1 = ρxxt + ϕxσ(st+1)εx,t+1 (2.3)
4ct+1 = µc+ xt + ϕcσ(st+1)εc,t+1 (2.4)
4dt+1 = µd+ρdxt + ϕdσ(st+1)εd,t+1 + ρcdϕcσ(st+1)εc,t+1 (2.5)
where lowercase letters represent natural logarithms, 4ct+1 = logCt+1 − logCt.
The state variable xt models a persistent, mean-reverting conditional growth rate
of consumption and dividends as in Bansal and Yaron [2004]. Aggregate shocks
are independent and identically distributed normal random variables:
εx,t+1, εc,t+1, εd,t+1 ∼i.i.d. N (0, 1) (2.6)
I allow for correlation between consumption and dividend growth by introducing
the parameter ρcd ∈ R as in Bansal et al. [2012]. Aggregate shocks share a common
stochastic volatility σ(st+1) that is a function of a binary state variable:
st ∼i.i.d. Bernoulli(pih) (2.7)
When st+1 = 1, the volatility of consumption and dividend growth σ(st+1 = 1) =
ςh > 1 is high relatively to normal times σ(st+1 = 0) = 1. Histories of volatility
states have superscripts st+1 ≡ {. . . , st−1, st, st+1}.1 Aggregate consumption is
distributed equally to all investors in each period, hence there is no heterogeneity
1I deviate from the first order autoregression law of motion for a common stochastic variance
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in ex post consumption growth. The difference between the aggregate consumption
and dividend endowments defines agents’ labor income process. For parsimony, I
collect all parameters of the model in a vector Θ.
Investor i prices some asset j such that the consumption Euler equation derived
from the optimality conditions to the problem posted by (2.1) and (2.2):
Ei,t
[
βϑ
(
Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)− ϑ
ψ
Rϑ−1c,t+1Rj,t+1
]
= 1 (2.8)
I assume consumption growth and returns for any assets in consideration are jointly
conditionally lognormal. Then, investor i’s log stochastic discount factor mi,t+1 is
a function of consumption growth and the return on the aggregate consumption
claim rc,t+1:
mi,t+1 ≡ ϑ log β − ϑ
ψ
4ct+1 +
(
ϑ− 1)rc,t+1 (2.9)
and their consumption Euler equation may be conveniently expressed in logs:
Ei,t
[
mi,t+1 + rj,t+1
]
+ 1/2Vari,t
(
mi,t+1 + rj,t+1
)
= 0 (2.10)
There is no arbitrage, thus each investor’s Euler equation pricing any asset j holds
in expectation. For the sake of expositional clarity, I utilize the no arbitrage
assumption to construct an “average agent” whose Euler equation satisfies the
cross-sectional average of (2.10) for every period t:∫
Ei,t
[
mi,t+1 + rj,t+1
]
di+ 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mi,t+1 + rj,t+1
)
di = 0 (2.11)
While the true identity of the average agent is unknown, deliberately assuming the
point of view of the average agent conveniently replaces the task of accounting for
an arbitrarily chosen atomistic agent.
in Bansal and Yaron [2004] because solving the model necessitates an iterative procedure to
find a fixed point over a countable number of volatility histories. A continuous support for
volatility shocks paired with persistence makes the task of counting volatility histories, even
under a discretization procedure, numerically unwieldy.
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2.2.1 Information Sets and Higher Order Beliefs
Investors cannot directly observe the conditional mean of consumption growth, xt.
Rather, each investor i privately observes a noisy signal xi,t in each period t:
xi,t = xt + ϕsi,t (2.12)
where i,t ∼i.i.d. N (0, 1) is independent and identically distributed over time, as
well as in the cross-section of investors. In any given period agents differ solely by
their expectations of consumption growth. This is the heart of the model.
The consequence of assuming limited information, rational expectations, and
no arbitrage is that agents’ higher order beliefs enter the state space of the model.
That is, agents recursively forecast the forecast of other agents. I motivate this
idea with a simple example: consider the case of power utility when ϑ = 1. After
solving forward in time, the Euler equation for agent i pricing the dividend claim
evaluates to:
pdt = δ +
(
1− 1/ψ)Ei,t[xt]di+ κ1,m(1− 1/ψ)Ei,t[Ei,t+1[xt+1]]+ · · ·
· · ·+Ei,t
[
Ei,t+1
[· · ·Ei,t+τ[xt+τ] · · · ]]+· · ·+1/2 ∞∑
τ=0
κτ1,mVari,t+τ
(
mt+1+τ+rm,t+1+τ
)
(2.13)
where δ is a constant in terms of model parameters. Inside investor i’s expectation
operator conditional on their information in period t, I substitute out investor i’s
future conditional expectations and replace them with expectations of some agent
j 6= i:
Ei,t
[
Ei,t+1
[· · ·Ei,t+τ[xt+τ] · · · ]] = Ei,t[Ej,t+1[· · ·Ej,t+τ[xt+τ] · · · ]] (2.14)
for τ > 0. Investor i has no special information about future expectations of
investor j. I assume investor i’s average expectation is coincident with investor i’s
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expection of investor j’s expectation:
Ei,t
[
Ei,t+1
[· · ·Ei,t+τ[xt+τ] · · · ]] = Ei,t[∫ Ej,t+1[· · · ∫ Ej,t+τ[xt+τ]dj · · · ]dj]
(2.15)
Applying the assumptions in equations (2.14) and (2.15), equation (2.13) can be
modified for the average investor by aggregating over the cross-section of investors:
pdt = δ +
(
1− 1/ψ) ∫ Ei,t[xt]di+ κ1,m(1− 1/ψ) ∫ Ei,t[∫ Ej,t+1[xt+1]dj]di+ · · ·
· · ·+
∫
Ei,t
[∫
Ej,t+1
[· · · ∫ Ej,t+τ[xt+τ]dj · · · ]dj]di+ · · ·
· · ·+ 1/2
∞∑
τ=0
κτ1,m
∫
Vari,t+τ
(
mt+1+τ + rm,t+1+τ
)
di (2.16)
From the perspective of the average agent in period t, the cross-sectional average
expectation
∫
Ei,t
[
xt
]
di is relevant for determining the price, which I call the first
order expectation. In the model, it is common knowledge that investors form ra-
tional expectations. Hence investors’ first order expectations are optimal forecasts
of the true state, and the first order expectations behave as stochastic processes
with publicly known characteristics. Investors use this knowledge when forming
second order expectations. Since prices recursively discount the present value of
consumption growth into the infinite future, so too does
∫
Ei,t
[∫
Ej,t+1
[
xt+1
]
dj
]
di
and every higher order expectation in the future become relevant state variables.
To tame notation, I follow the convention of Nimark [2011] and define each higher
order expectation:
x(k) ≡
∫
Ei,t
[
x(k−1)t
]
di (2.17)
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with x(0)t ≡ xt and the full hierarchy of expectations Xt ∈ R∞:
Xt ≡

xt
x(1)t
x(2)t
...

(2.18)
I refer to Xt as the term structure of consensus growth. To simplify the algebraic
manipulations required to solve the model, I define the operator H which acts on
Xt to annihilate the lowest order expectation and replaces it with the next highest:
H =
[
0
∞×1
I∞
∞×∞
]
(2.19)
For example, first order expectations are simply the first element of HXt:∫
Ei,t
[
xt
]
di = e′1HXt (2.20)
2.2.2 Solving the Model
Because I focus the model on explaining time series moments of the equity pre-
mium, I price three assets as in Beeler and Campbell [2012]: a claim on aggregate
consumption, a claim on aggregate dividends, and the ex ante risk free rate. For
analytical convenience, I log linearize the return on the consumption and dividend
claims like Campbell and Shiller [1988]:
rc,t+1 = κ0 + κ1pct+1 − pct +4ct+1 (2.21)
rm,t+1 = κ0,m + κ1,mpdt+1 − pdt +4dt+1 (2.22)
The ex ante risk-free rate rf,t derives from the Euler equation pricing an asset that
matures after one period with a certain a numeriare payoff equal to one:
rf,t = −
∫
Ei,t[mt+1]di− 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mt+1
)
di (2.23)
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I conjecture (and verify in the appendix) affine state-contingent functional forms
for the three endogenous prices:
pct = g
pc
0 (s
t) + gpcx (s
t)′Xt (2.24)
pdt = g
pd
0 (s
t) + gpdx (s
t)′Xt (2.25)
rf,t = g
rf
0 (s
t) + grfx (s
t)′Xt (2.26)
where the (st) notation indicates a functional dependence of the coefficients on the
realized history of volatility states. Additionally, I conjecture Xt follows a first
order vector autoregression with state-contingent coefficients:
Xt = A(s
t)Xt−1 +B(st)
 εt
i,t
 (2.27)
where εt is a nε × 1 vector of aggregate shocks. Investor i is aware of (2.27) but
cannot directly observe Xt. Rather, they observe a ny × 1 vector Yi,t of aggregate
growth rates and returns, in addition to their private noisy signal:
Yi,t =

xi,t
4ct
4dt
rm,t
rf,t−1

(2.28)
where the quantities in (2.28) evolve according to equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.5),
(2.22), and (2.23). Taken together with (2.27), these equations form a state space
system:
Xt = A(s
t)Xt−1 +B(st)
 εt
i,t
 (2.29)
Yi,t = µY (s
t) +C1(s
t)Xt +C2(s
t)Xt−1 +D(st)
 εt
i,t
 (2.30)
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I assume the time series observations of the market return rm,t+1 and ex ante
risk free rate rf,t are peppered with very small noise shocks εrm,t+1 ∼i.i.d. N (0, 1)
and εrf,t+1 ∼i.i.d. N (0, 1) that are scaled by ϕrm and ϕrf , respectively. The noise
shocks play an important role increasing the stochastic rank of the state space
system. Without the noise shocks, the true state xt is an invertible function of
observables, effectively nullifying the role of private information in the model.
Bansal et al. [2012] utilize invertibility, for example, to identify xt by projecting
consumption growth on the risk free rate and the price-dividend ratio. The state
xt is fully revealed to their representative agent in every period. Nonetheless,
investors never learn the true state in my model. The best investor i can do
is to endogenously form expectations of Xt that are optimal by some objective
function, given their information set. A natural candidate for such expectations
is the Kalman filter, which is optimal in the sense it is the minimum variance
estimator of the state. Accordingly, investor i forecasts the state Ei,t
[
Xt
] ≡ Xi,t|t
by utilizing their knowledge (2.29) and (2.30) in combination with the Kalman
filter:
Xi,t|t = A(st)Xi,t−1|t−1 +K(st)
(
Yi,t − µY (st)−
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)
Xi,t−1|t−1
)
(2.31)
The technical approach investors employ to form expectations is, from the econo-
metrician’s point of view, similar to Schorfheide et al. [2016], who use a Kalman
filter along with a rich set of measurement errors to estimate long-run risks in the
United States with data reaching back to the Great Depression. The Kalman filter
is also used extensively in real world economic forecasting, so its application in
the model is a realistic foundation for how practitioners can estimate consensus
beliefs. Given the expectations (2.31) of each investor i ∈ (0, 1), the average agent
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estimates the state by a simple aggregation of individual agents expectations:
Xt|t ≡
∫ 1
0
Xi,t|tdi (2.32)
With knowledge of the average agent’s expectations, it is possible now to construct
(2.27). The true long-run risk component xt follows the publicly known law of mo-
tion given in (2.3). Higher order expectations are formed as endogenous functions
of the known model parameters Θ and (2.32). I construct the sets of matrices
A(st) and B(st) by carefully summing the implied dynamics of (2.3) and (2.32):
A(st) =
ρx1×1 01×k¯
0
k¯×1
0
k¯×k¯
+
 01×1 01×k¯
0
k¯×1
[
A(st)−K(st)(C(st)A(st) +C2(st))]−
k¯×k¯
+
 01×k¯+1[
K(st)(C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t))
]
−
k¯×k¯+1
 (2.33)
B(st) =
 ϕx1×1 01×nε
0
nε×1
0
nε×nε
+
 01×nε+1[
K(st)(C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(st))
]
−
1×nε+1
 (2.34)
In the matrices above, the object K(st) is the Kalman gain and Dε(st) is a subma-
trix of D(st) omitting the noise shock, which are both explicitly characterized in
the appendix. In their native forms, (2.33) and (2.34) describe the infinite dimen-
sional dynamics of the expectation hierarchy. Therefore any tractable numerical
solution to the model necessitates a finite dimensional approximation to the expec-
tations hierarchy Xt, truncating the size of A(st) and B(st). The minus subscript[·]− indicates the approximation step required to set the order of Xt ∈ Rk¯+1 for
some 0 < k¯ < ∞. The choice of k¯ induces approximation errors in the evolution
of the state Xt, though Nimark [2011] shows such errors can become negligible for
finite k¯. His method demonstrates price dynamics can quickly converge by plotting
impulse response functions for increasing values of k¯.
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Another numerical issue sprouts from the fact the matrices in (2.33) and (2.34)
are functionally dependent on the full history of volatility states st. Given the
model is structured upon an infinite time horizon, this implies the length of st
grows one at a time with each successive period. Since I assume volatility can
attain only two values, a solution to the model has 2t distinct histories of volatility
states, and after a handful of periods the model is more or less impossible to solve
on a conventional computer. I follow Nimark [2014] by shortening the history of st
to rolling window of a predetermined length τ . In this way, the model is solvable
over the 2τ histories of st. I denote the set of truncated volatility histories S(τ) ≡
{(st−τ+1, st−τ+2, . . . , st−1, st)}. Because the number of histories grows exponentially
in τ , so too does the computer time required to solve the model. But computational
speed alone is not a sufficient criteria for choosing the number of states to track,
as shorter histories induce larger approximation errors in the Kalman filtering
equations. Therefore an ideal choice of τ is both numerically fast and yields small
errors. With this in mind, I choose the value τ = 8, which produces 256 distinct
histories for every object in the model dependent upon st. With the state dynamics
of Xt tamed by restricting attention to histories st of finite length, and considering
only the first k¯ orders of expectations, conditional expectations within the model
must be defined explicitly in order to solve the model. For example, the expectation
of the average agent in period t of a random variable in period t + 1 requires use
of truncated histories lead forward one period in time:∫
Ei,t[gpcx (st+1)Xt+1]di =
(
pigpcx (s
t+1
1 )
′A(st+11 ) +
(
1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))HXt
(2.35)
where the histories st+11 and s
t+1
0 drop the most distant volatility state and add a
realization of either a high or low volatility state in the next period, respectively.
I present the full details of a fixed point algorithm for solving the model in the
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appendix.
Rounding up the model solution, I define a limited information equilibrium:
1. A limited information equilibrium is for every truncated volatility history st ∈
S(τ):
1. Functions mapping the state into endogenous quantities (2.24), (2.25), and
(2.26).
2. A law of motion for the state (2.29).
3. The aggregate resource constraints:∫
Wi,tdi = Wt+1 (2.36)∫
Ci,tdi = Ct+1 (2.37)
Wt+1 = Rc,t+1
(
Wt − Ct
)
(2.38)
Such that all investors i ∈ (0, 1) satisfy the optimality conditions of their utility
maximization problems (2.1) subject to their budget constraints (2.2).
2.3 Calibration
In total, the model has sixteen parameters:
Θ ≡ {γ, ψ, β, µc, µd, ρx, ρd, ρcd, ϕx, ϕc, ϕd, ϕrm, ϕrf , ϕs, ς, pi} (2.39)
Table 2.1 shows their calibrated values. I calibrate eleven of the sixteen model
parameters in Θ relating to preferences, consumption growth, and dividend growth
using the estimates from Bansal et al. [2012] (BKY). A number of papers estimate
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parameters in the long-run risks model, for example, Bansal and Yaron [2004]
(BY), Beeler and Campbell [2012] (BC), and Schorfheide et al. [2016] (SSY). The
commonality in these papers is that they all focus on U.S. data after 1930, but vary
by their econometric techniques and model assumptions. BY and BKY employ
the generalized method of moments to esitmate the model with annual data. SSY
perform a Bayesian analysis using a sequential monte carlo method to estimate
a nonlinear state-space model with mixed frequency data. Despite differences in
econometric methodology and some minor theoretical variations in the models, all
of the estimations manifest consistency in their best-fit parameter values. Risk
aversion γ is at or near ten, which is commonly hailed as a success for the long-run
risks model in light of the many vintages of asset pricing models prone to generating
values of γ in excess of one hundred– a magnitude that is impossible to reconcile
with the microeconomic evidence. The EIS parameter ψ is consistently greater
than one, which is congruent with the microeconomic evidence of Gruber [2013],
and provides a number of important implications within the model. For instance,
given the level of risk aversion, investors prefer to resolve uncertainty surrounding
future utility flows sooner rather than later. This drives up the equity premium
when volatility is high, or when expected consumption growth is low. Hall [1988]
and Campbell [1999] argue for a value of ψ < 1, close to zero. They estimate EIS by
interpreting it as the slope from projecting time series data of consumption growth
on the real risk free rate and price-dividend ratio. Bansal and Yaron [2004] show
this estimate of EIS is biased downward by stochastic volatility in the process for
consumption growth. All evidence notwithstanding, the debate over EIS remains
an unsettled matter. The estimations performed by BY, BKY, and CB tend to fit
the risk free rate poorly, a challenge unanimously shared by modern consumption
based asset pricing models. SSY improve the model fit by adding a preference
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shock similar to Albuquerque et al. [2015]. However, the exogenous preference
shock serves, more or less, as a reduced form stochastic process suited to match
the risk free rate and lacks a firm microfoundation.
All of the estimations mentioned thus far produce a value of ρx near one,
indicating the existence of a small, mean-reverting component to the conditional
mean of consumption growth. In the full information setting, a large value of ρx
assures the risk price for long-run risk shocks εx,t+1 is large, and is a necessary
component to matching the equity premium. In a recent paper, Nakamura et al.
[2016] estimate parameters in a consumption process with long-run risks using a
panel of sixteen countries with over one hundred and twenty years of data. Their
estimation yields strong evidence for long-run risks in consumption growth, and
has the added benefit of excluding asset price data, immunizing their parameter
estimates from the accusation that asset price data forces the large magnitude of
ρx.
One aspect of my model that reduces its fit to the data is my choice to con-
struct a stochastic volatility process that is independent and identically distributed
over two discrete states. All variants of the full information long-run risks model
discussed in this section have at least one first order autoregressive process driv-
ing the square of volatility. These models can outperform mine insofar as they
offer a continuous support for σ(st+1) and time series persistence, features both
supported by the data. Continuous support for σ(st+1) is problematic for my nu-
merical procedure because it necessitates computing infinitely many fixed points
over infinitely many volatility histories. Discretizing σ(st+1) helps by making the
number of possible volatility histories S countably infinite. Truncating the set of
histories to include only the past τ observations generates a finite set S(τ) with
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precisely 2τ elements, reducing the computational burden from infinitely many
fixed points to 2τ . Given τ , the probability of a high volatility state pi and the
level of a high volatility state ς must be chosen in a way that best preserves the
time series fit of the model. This choice offers some flexibility since the parameters
pi and ς are not well identified–owing to the infinitely many ways to partition the
time series data into two samples. Therefore I make a stylistic choice to reflect an
intuitive notion of “bad times” that is consistent with the data by setting ς = 2
and pi = 0.05. This means, on average, a serious bout of high volatility occurs
approximately once every twenty years. I came to these numbers by simulating
ten million observations from the law of motion for variance using the parame-
ters from BKY. If the value of variance veered into negative territory, I censored it
with a small positive number. Then, I scaled each observation by the ergodic mean
of variance, and took the square root to produce an average volatility multiplier.
The parameter value pi = 0.05 reflects the 1− pi empirical quantile of the ergodic
distribution of volatility multipliers, and ς = 2 is the sample mean of volatility
multipliers in excess in excess of the 1− pi quantile.
2.4 Discussions of Results
The results of the model primary focus on risk premia of financial assets. What
level of compensation do investors require to accept some non-zero weighting of a
given return distribution in their portfolios? The answer to this question is settled
by how the returns of a particular asset of interest covary with investors’ stochas-
tic discount factors. Assets that produce streams of returns with low covariance
to the average investor’s stochastic discount factor carry a small risk premium,
becuase they are less likely to inconvenience the investor with bad payoffs when
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Parameter Calibrated Value
Preferences
γ 10
ψ 1.5
β 0.9989
Consumption Growth
µc 0.0015
ϕc 0.0072
ρx 0.975
ϕx 0.038ϕc
Dividend Growth
µd 0.0015
ρd 2.5
ρcd 2.6
ϕd 5.96ϕc
Noise
ϕs {0, ϕx, 2ϕx, 3ϕx, 4ϕx}
ϕrm 0.02
ϕrf 0.02
Volatility
ς 2.00
pi 0.05
Table 2.1: Parameter estimates for the preferences, consumption growth, and divi-
dend growth categories from BKY. They estimate the model using the generalized
method of moments with annual data beginning in 1930 and ending in 2008. I
solve the model over a discrete grid of parameter values for noise ϕs. At the small-
est value ϕs = 0, agents in the model have full information. At the largest value
ϕs = 4ϕx, the risk price for long-run shocks is negligible.
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their marginal utility growth is highest. Oppositely, returns of assets with high
covariance to the investor’s marginal utility growth are a poor hedge for bad times
and therefore require the highest compensation to hold. Because I price asssets in
the model from the point of view of the average agent, it is this agent’s stochastic
discount factor I consider when thinking about risk premia.
Formally, the equity premium is the negative average covariance between the
stochastic discount factor mt+1 and the market return rm,t+1:∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1 − rf,t
]
di+
1
2
∫
Vari,t
(
rm,t+1
)
di = −
∫
Covi,t(mt+1, rm,t+1)di (2.40)
where, provided all relevant quantites satisfy joint conditional log-normality, the
average covariance is a simple expectation:
−
∫
Covi,t(mt+1, rm,t+1)di = −
∫
Ei,t
[
λε(s
t+1)′Σ(st+1)εt+1ε′t+1Σ(st+1)
′βε(st+1)
]
di
(2.41)
The fundamental difference between equations (2.40) and (2.41) and consumption-
based models with representative agents are that the moments are cross-sectional
averages. I organize objects on the right-hand side of equation (2.41) inside the
expectaion such that they bare conventional economic interpretations. The nε× 1
vector λε(st+1) contains risk prices for the shocks in εt+1. A risk price is the
premium an investor would pay to perfectly hedge a specific source of risk in their
stochastic discount factor. For instance, if an asset provided a return exactly equal
to the consumption shock every period, then an investor would require a premium
equal to the risk price of the consumption shock to hold the asset. The derivation of
λε(s
t+1) simply requires solving for the innovation in the average agent’s stochastic
discount factor:
mt+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
mt+1
]
di ≡ λε(st+1)′Σ(st+1)εt+1 + λX(st+1)′Xt + λσ(st+1) (2.42)
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where the nε × nε matrix Σ(st+1) is a diagonal matrix that scales each shock in
εt+1 by their respective time series volatility. I refer to Σ(st+1) as the quantity of
risk. Lastly, the nε×1 vector βε(st+1) are sensitivities of innovations in the market
return rm,t+1 to aggregate shocks εt+1:
rm,t+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1
]
di = βε(s
t+1)′Σ(st+1)εt+1 + βX(st+1)Xt + βσ(st+1) (2.43)
A detailed derivation of all of the objects in (2.41) is in the appendix.
2.4.1 Disagreement Shrinks the Risk Price for Long-Run
Shocks
Figure 2.1 shows the unconditional mean risk price for the long-run shock is a
decreasing function of noise. In fact, for a very small level of disagreement, the
risk price for long-run shocks is negligible. When the level of noise is equal to
the time series volatility of the long-run shocks, ϕs = ϕx, the risk price for long-
run shocks is approximately cut in half relative to the full information model. And
when noise is set to twice the time series volatility of long-run shocks, the reduction
in the risk price relative to the full information model is more than eighty percent.
The bottom line is investors are less willing to pay a substantive premium to hedge
long-run risk shocks in their stochastic discount factors when the precisions of their
signals is low relative to the time series volatility of the long-run risk shock.
To understand this result, consider the risk price for the long-run shock under
full information ϕs = 0:
λεx =
κ1
(
γ − 1/ψ)
1− κ1ρx (2.44)
27
The large risk price for long-run shocks is driven by a highly persistent autoregres-
sive process for the conditional mean xt, in addition to the coefficient of relative
risk aversion being markedly larger than the inverse EIS γ−1/ψ > 0. Moreover, it is
straightforward to see that under power utility, a special case of Epstein-Zin-Weil
preferences where γ = 1/ψ, the risk price for long-run shocks is necessarily zero.
The important takeaway is that under full information, equation (2.44) is large
and does not change over time.
When the scale of noise is positive ϕs > 0, higher order expectations enter the
state space of the model and the mathematical form of risk price for the long-run
risk shock changes to:2
λεx(s
t) = κ1
(
ϑ− 1)gpcx (st)′B(st)exϕxσ(st) (2.45)
Thus the risk price in equation (2.45) is the product of model parameters, the en-
dogenous coefficients mapping higher order expectations to the price-consumption
ratio, and the scaled first column of the instantaneous impact matrix. The lin-
earization constant κ1 ∈ (0, 1) is a function of the steady state price-consumption
ratio, and is very close to one in value regardless of the scale of noise I employ,
hence the latter two terms must drive the negative relationship between noise and
the risk price.
The motivation for this effect is found in the expectations of the average agent
(2.32). In each period, the average agent’s higher order expectations are a weighted
sum of their a priori estimate of the state and a noisy innovation in observed data.
When the scale of noise is zero, ϕs = 0, the average agent perfectly observes
the state in every time period, therefore the Kalman gain allocates zero weight
to the observed evolution of macroeconomic time series and places unity weight
2Despite the visible differences between equations (2.44) and (2.45), the numerical solution to
the model perfectly equates these two quantities when ϕs = 0.
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on investors’ perfectly accurate signals of the conditional mean of consumption
growth. Accordingly, higher order expectations are identical x(0)t = x
(k)
t for all
k > 0 and t ∈ N. As the scale of noise increases ϕs → ∞ and the quality of
investors’ information sets deteriorates, the Kalman gain shifts weight away from
the noisy signal toward the observed macroeconomic aggregates and prices, as these
alternate data series become valuable sources of information regarding investors’
conditional expectations of consumption growth. Importantly, the magnitude of
the shift away from the noisy signal and toward data innovations increases when
signals are less precise. This effects the price dynamics gpcx (st) and the scaled
impact matrix B(st)ex/ϕxσ(st) in a way that attenuates the magnitude of the risk
price for the long-run shock. That is, the elements of gpcx (st) and B(s
t)ex/ϕxσ(st) are
decreasing in the level of noise ϕs, so their product in equation (2.45) naturally
leads to a smaller risk price. This is driven by the first column of the Kalman gain
K(st) in the construction of gpcx (st) and B(s
t)ex/ϕxσ(st) through equations (A.43) and
(2.34).
Figure 2 shows the market return’s average beta for the long-run risk shock
is decreasing in noise. The market return is less sensitive to long-run risks as
investors’ information sets disperse. The intuition for this negative relationship
is similar to the negative relationship between risk prices and noise. In the full-
information benchmark, the market return beta for long-run risk is:
βεx = κ1,m
ρd − 1/ψ
1− κ1,mρx (2.46)
Equation (2.46) shows the market return is more sensitive to long-run risk shocks as
financial leverage ρd increases, when EIS ψ increases, when long-run consumption
growth is more persistent, and for a higher steady state price-dividend ratio. When
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Figure 2.1: The unconditional average risk prices for the long-run risk shock across
different levels of noise. Full information indicates ϕs = 0. I calibrate positive
values of noise to multiples of the time series volatility of the long-run risk shock.
As investors’ information sets grow more disparate, the average risk price for the
long-run shock approaches zero.
the scale of noise ϕs > 0, the beta for the long-run risk shock is given by:
βεx(s
t) = κ1,mg
pd
x (s
t)′
B(st)ex
ϕxσ(st)
(2.47)
What drives the shrinking βεx(st) as ϕs → ∞? It cannot be κ1,m, because the
steady state price-dividend ratio does not change much with ϕs. The correct
attribution focuses on the shrinking elements in gpdx (st) and B(s
t)ex/ϕxσ(st) as noise
ϕs increases. Again, the Kalman gain K(st) is the source of these changes. For
B(st)ex/ϕxσ(st), I refer to the explanation given earlier in this section, and logic
similar to gpcx (st) holds for gpdx (st) through equation (A.47). As a result, innovations
in the market return are less sensitive to long-run shocks when investors’ have
heterogeneous beliefs surrounding expected consumption growth.
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Figure 2.2: The unconditional average risk prices and betas for the long-run risk
shock across different levels of noise. Full information indicates ϕs = 0. I calibrate
positive values of noise to multiples of the time series volatility of the long-run risk
shock ϕx. As investors information sets grow more disparate, the average beta for
the long-run shock approaches zero.
2.4.2 The Risk Price for Long-Run Shocks is Countercycli-
cal
Figure 3 shows the risk price for long-run shocks is increasing in recent spells
of high volatility. The leftmost bar indicates the risk price for the long-run risk
shock is slightly larger than fifty after τ periods of consecutive low volatility, a
history of states I call “Smooth Sailing”. The next bar immediately to the right
of “Smooth Sailing” has the same history of low volatility states, except the most
recent volatility state is high. In this case, the risk price nearly doubles to a value
of about one hundred. Moving to the the next bar to the right, the history is of low
volatility states, except the most recent two periods are high volatility. Here, the
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risk price is over one hundred and fifteen. This pattern continues, monotonically
adding another high volatility state until the full history is uniformly high, which
I call “Wild Times”. The takeaway is the risk price for the long-run risk shocks
increases at a decreasing rate in the local history of time series volatility, yielding
a value slightly larger than one hundred and twenty three during “Wild Times”.
The time-varying behavior of the risk price in equation (2.45) is in stark contrast
to the time-invariant risk price (2.44) of Bansal and Yaron [2004]. While Bansal
and Yaron [2004] do achieve time-varying risk premia, this is the consequence of
scaling equation (2.44) by an exogenous law of motion for the quantity of risk.
The model presented in this paper achieves a similar effect because the quantity of
risk Σ(st+1) scales risk prices in (2.41), however, the sources of time-varying risk
premia are twofold because λε(st+1) changes over time as well.
So why is the risk-price for long-run shocks positively related to time series
volatility? The law of motion for xt, equation (2.3), evolves according to a het-
eroskedastic shock. Investors observe a signal (2.12) that obscures xt with ho-
moskedastic noise. The result is the precision of the signal (2.12) is higher during
high volatility states of nature because the volatility of the process driving the true
state ϕxσ(st+1) increases relative to the scale of noise ϕs:∫
Vari,t(xi,t+1) =
(
ϕxσ(st+1)
)2
+ ϕ2s (2.48)
Then, as shown earlier in Section 2.4.1, the risk price for long-run shocks ap-
proaches its full information limit as the scale of noise approaches zero. I argue for
this feature in the model, that investors have more precise signals in high volatility
states of nature, with the recent empirical work of Loh and Stulz [2015]. They show
in “bad times”, or when ex ante uncertainty is high, analyst forecasts of earnings
are more accurate than in “good times” when uncertainty is low. Loh and Stulz
argue increasing analyst accuracy during bad times is the result of intensified ef-
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forts arising from career concerns. While my model abstracts from the specifics
of agents’ effort or career worries, it accurately captures the same signal-to-noise
dynamics with a homoskedastic noise shock clouding investor information and a
hetroskedastic shock driving the state.
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Figure 2.3: Risk prices for the long-run risk shock εx,t over different volatility
histories. I define “Smooth Sailing” as a τ -consecutive periods of low volatility, and
oppositely, “Wild Times” as τ -consecutive periods of high volatility. The second
bar immediately to the right of “Smooth Sailing” changes the most recent period
from low to high volatility. The third bar does the same, but for the two most
recent periods. The pattern continues until the last bar, where all states are high
volatility. The scale of noise is calibrated ϕs = 2ϕx.
2.4.3 Three Factors Explain The Term Structure of Con-
sumption Growth
Litterman and Scheinkman [1991] show three statistical factors summarize nearly
all of the time series variation in treasury bond yields. They construct factors
by computing the first three principal components from the empirical covariance
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matrix of a panel of bond yields. The first factor equally weights all bond yields,
a level factor: all bond yields rise and fall together. The second factor puts high
weight on short maturity yields and low weight on long maturity yields, a slope
factor, which proxies a steepening or flattening of the yield curve. The third factor
is a curvature factor, where long and short duration yields move opposite inter-
mediate maturity yields. The success of Litterman and Scheinkman is not limited
to explaining the comovement of bond yields. Research using their procedure re-
veals interesting level, slope, and curvature factors in other asset pricing domains.
For example, Lustig et al. [2011] find a slope factor explains most of the common
variation in the cross-section of currency returns. And in a recent paper, Clarke
[2016] discovers a level, slope, and curvature factor in portfolios of stocks sorted
by their expected returns. He finds, “A standard linearized Consumption Capital
Asset Pricing Model explains almost all of the spread in average returns across
portfolios. Since the Level, Slope, and Curvature model explains almost all of the
variance in the expected return sorted portfolios, another interpretation is that
the model represents high frequency factors mimicking changes in expected future
consumption growth.”
Figure 2.4 shows a level, slope, and curvature factor for the expectations hier-
archy. I construct the three factors by simulating one million observations of the
expectations hierarchy and then computing principal components from the empir-
ical covariance matrix. The first factor equally weights higher order expectations,
a level factor. The second factor puts high weight on lower order expectations, and
low weight on higher order expectations, a slope factor. The third factor puts high
weight on lower and higher order expectations, an low weight on intermediate order
expectations, a curvature factor. Table 2.2 decomposes the variance explained by
the three factors. The first factor accounts for over ninety eight percent of the vari-
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Figure 2.4: Plots of the coefficients from the first three principal components of
the empirical covariance matrix of Xt with a simulated sample of 1,000,000 obser-
vations under τ = 8 and k¯ = 12. X-axis labels refer to the order of expectation,
and the y-axis are scalar magnitudes of loadings on principal components.
ation in higher order expectations, indicating the strong comovement in consensus
expectations of consumption growth. The second factor explains considerably less
than the first, nearly two percent of the variation. And the curvature factor ex-
plains merely twenty basis points. Taken together, the three factors account for
over ninety nine percent of the time series variation in higher order expectations.
Table A.1 decomposes the variance of the individual higher order expectations.
The level factor explains over ninety percent of the variation for every order of
expectation. The slope and curvature factors have the most explanatory power
in the lowest and highest order expectations, and very little in intermediate order
expectations.
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Level Slope Curvature
Share of Explained Variance 0.982 0.016 0.002
Table 2.2: Shares of variance in the empirical covariance matrix of Xt explained
by the first three principal components (level, slope, and curvature). Values in the
table are each principal component’s associated eigenvalue divided by the sum of
all eigenvalues. I estimate the empirical covariance matrix of Xt with a simulated
sample of 1,000,000 observations under τ = 8 and k¯ = 12.
2.4.4 Disagreement Mutes Price Responses to Changes in
State Variables
Figure 2.5 shows impulse response of the price-consumption ratio to a long-run risk
shock. The blue line represents the response under full information, and the green
line represents the response under limited information. The relative response of the
full information price-consumption ratio is over fifty percent larger than the price-
consumption ratio under limited information. Why does the price-consumption
ratio in the limited information economy react to an important shock with iner-
tia? The answer lies in the signal extraction problem faced by investors. Under full
information, investors observe the long-run shock, and given their perfect knowl-
edge of the state, prices accurately represent the evolving state of the economy in
future periods. Under limited information, an arbitrary investor observes the state
with noise, and then solves a signal extraction problem to devise an operative best-
estimate of the state in each future period via the Kalman filter. The hierarchy of
expectations Xt is a construction of investors’ beliefs surrounding the future path
of xt, representing investors’ consensus expectations of their future average con-
sumption growth. The Kalman filter uses information from all aggregate shocks
to optimally estimate the hidden state, thus the noise present in investors’ signals
shifts weight away from the long-run shock and toward the aggregate consumption
36
and dividend shocks. This creates meaningful inertia in investors’ expectations,
and consequently in the price-consumption ratio.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse response functions for the price-consumption ratio from a two
standard deviation shock to εx,t. Data plotted in the top graph was generated
with consecutive periods of low volatility, and the bottom graph was generated
with consecutive periods of high volatility. The level of noise is calibrated to
ϕs = 2ϕx.
Figure 2.7 shows impulse response functions for the hierarchy of expectationsXt
to a long-run risk shock, consumption shock, and dividend shock. In the top plot,
the expectations hierarchy responds positively to a positive long-run risk shock.
The first-order expectation x(1)t nearly mimics the behavior of the true state xt, the
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response functions for the price-dividend ratio from a two
standard deviation shock to εx,t. Data plotted in the top graph was generated
with consecutive periods of low volatility, and the bottom graph was generated
with consecutive periods of high volatility. The level of noise is calibrated to
ϕs = 2ϕx.
second order expectation x(2)t nearly mimics the first order expectation x
(1)
t , and
so on. Nimark [2011] shows the comovement of the expectations hierarchy Xt is a
decreasing function of the scale of the idiosyncratic noise shocks ϕs. As agents’ in-
formation sets converge to full information, the expectations hierarchy Xt becomes
perfectly correlated with the true state xt, which is equivalent to the original set-
ting of Bansal and Yaron [2004]. Further, in the full information economy, the law
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of motion for xt is purely exogenous, therefore under no circumstances would xt
ever respond to a consumption shock or dividend shock. The expectations hier-
archy Xt, on the other hand, does respond to consumption and dividend shocks
under limited information. The bottom two plots of Figure 2.7 exhibit this inter-
esting behavior. In response to a positive consumption shock, the largest orders
of expectations have a pronounced response relative to the lowest orders. Under
the metaphor that Xt is a term structure of expectations, a positive consumption
shock is tantamount to a positive shock to a steepening factor. Intuitively, the
sign makes sense because a positive consumption shock impacts both consumption
and dividend growth positively, in the same way a positive shock to xt would. The
opposite dynamics hold true for the dividend shock–the expectations hierarchy Xt
responds negatively, and most dramatically in the largest orders of expectations.
2.4.5 Disagreement Increases During High Volatility Spells
Figure 2.8 presents a plot of the expectations hierarchy simulated for one hun-
dred periods. Below it is a plot of the interquartile range of consumption growth
forecasts. The first fifty periods of the simulation have uniformly low volatility.
Then, at the halfway point, the remaining fifty periods have high volatility. Ev-
idently the higher volatility of long-run shocks leads to larger fluctuations in the
expectations hierarchy throughout the second half of the sample. The interquar-
tile range of consumption growth forecasts nearly doubles after transitioning into
the high volatility regime from the low volatility regime. Time series volatility
leads to high levels of disagreement in consumption growth forecasts through the
Kalman updating equation (2.31). To see why, notice each forecast of consumption
growth fi,t+1|t is treated as an independent and identical draw form a conditional
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distribution of forecasts:
fi,t+1|t ∼i.i.d. N
(
µc + e
′
1HXt, e
′
1HPi(s
t)H′e1
)
(2.49)
where the Pi(st) is the conditional cross-sectional covariance matrix:
Pi(s
t) = Ei,t
[(
Ei,t
[
Xt
]− ∫Ei,t[Xt]dj)(Ei,t[Xt]− ∫Ei,t[Xt]dj)′] (2.50)
Recall the precision of investors signals xi,t varies over time given the heteroskedas-
ticity in long-run shocks, thus increasing the precision of signals during bad states
of nature with high volatility. The consequence of greater precision is the first
column of the Kalman gain places larger weight on xi,t and less weight on other
observed sources of information. By subtracting equation (2.32) from (2.31), it is
clear to see how the time-variation in the Kalman gain directly influences the role
investor-specific noise plays in consensus forecast dispersion:
Ei,t
[
Xt
]− ∫ Ei,t[Xt]dj =(
A(st)−K(st)(C1(st)A(st)+C2(st)))(Ei,t−1[Xt−1]−∫Ei,t−1[Xt−1]dj)+ K(st)Di,t
(2.51)
where the matrix D simply contains the scale parameters for investors’ signals:
D ≡

ϕs
0
0
0
0

(2.52)
Thus cross-sectional forecasts of consumption growth will tend to disperse when
time the time series volatility of aggregate shocks is high. This feature of the model
is broadly consistent with the data. Figure 2.9 plots the cross-sectional dispersion
of real nondurable consumption growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional
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Forecasters (SPF). Table 2.3 conditions time series averages of the interquartile
range of consumption growth forecasts on ex post business cycle classifications
provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). In recession
states of the business cycle, the average interquartile range is about 1.70% relative
to 1.28% during expansion states, indicating greater dispersion in forecasts during
bad times. While the model matches the direction of the relationship between
cross-sectional disagreement and time series volatility, it does not match the scale.
The survey of professional forecasters data yields estimates of the interquartile
range measured in percent, while forecast disagreement generated by the model
is measured in mere basis points. There are a number of possible explanations
for this fact. First, Clements [2014] provides evidence of anti-herding in SPF
data for inflation and output. Rulke et al. [2012] find similar results on a data
set including professional forecasters from around the globe. Forecasters working
in the private sector may have career incentives to enhance the marketability of
their forecasts by straying from the pack, increasing forecast dispersion as a result.
For instance, if customers rank forecasters by their recent relative performance,
and not their career spanning mean-squared errors, forecasters can capture a large
share of new customers by providing extreme forecasts. An example of this is
providing forecasts of a harsh recession when economic indicators begin to show
signs of slowing growth, and then claiming valuable foresight ex post if the extreme
prediction pans out. A second possibility is I have misspecified the information sets
of investors by focusing disagreement on a state variable with a relatively small
volatility. Simply expanding the state-space of the model to include a state with
a volatility similar to the time series volatility of aggregate consumption growth
would increase the spread in consumption growth forecasts to a scale seen in the
data. Third, it may be that professional forecasters are not privy to long-run risks
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in the way utilized in the asset pricing literature, and requiring forecasting agents
of to think of the world as an endowment economy is not a fruitful econometric
exercise.
Cycle Interquartile Range
1983 - 2015
Expansion 0.0128
Recession 0.0170
1990 - 2015
Expansion 0.0095
Recession 0.0143
Table 2.3: Average interquartile range of real nondurable consumption growth
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters conditioned on ex post NBER
business cycle classifications. The top half of the table reports averages for the full
sample from the third quarter of 1981 through the end of 2015. The bottom
half reports averages from the second quarter of 1990 through 2015. The Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in the second quarter of 1990
and dramatically increased the breadth and quality of the sample.
2.4.6 Consensus Forecast Errors are Priced Risk
Equation (2.53) shows the risk price for the expectations hierarchy:
λX(s
t)′ = −γe′1
(
I−H)+ (ϑ− 1)κ1(gpcx (st)′A(st)− ∫Ei,t−1[gpcx (st)′A(st)H]di)
(2.53)
The first term in (2.53) indicates the difference between the true state and the
first order expectation carries a risk price of γ. Therefore investors are willing
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to pay a premium to hedge their first order expectations deviation from the true
conditional mean growth rate. The second term in (2.53) prices a forecast error in
the evolution of the price consumption ratio. However, the second term is small
and insubstantial, and may be ignored for that reason. In the full information
economy, the risk price for aggregate consumption shocks is simply the coefficient
of relative risk aversion λεc = γ, and the risk price in the limited information
economy has approximately the same magnitude λX(st) ≈ γ. Intuitively, this
observation implies investors dislike consensus forecast errors between their first
order expectations and the conditional mean of consumption growth equally as
much as transient shocks to aggregate consumption. The tendency for first order
expectations to deviate from the true conditional mean is modulated by the noise
parameter. Section 2.4.4 shows that the in the expectations hierarchy is increasing
in the scale of noise ϕs. Therefore the quantitative importance of consensus forecast
errors grows as investor information sets diverge.
2.5 Conclusion
Consumption based asset pricing links investors’ marginal utility of consumption
to discount rates that price assets. If investors have Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences,
and there is a small, persistent component in expected consumption growth, then
news about the long-run economic growth carries a large risk price. This result
revolves around full information: at every point in time, the state of the economy is
precisely known to a representative investor. I extend the long-run risks economy
to include a large number of heterogeneous investors with imperfect knowledge of
conditional expected consumption and dividend growth. Investors use their knowl-
edge of deep parameters in the economy and the laws of motion of driving the un-
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observed state variables to estimate the true position of the economy via a signal
extraction exercise. Consensus beliefs about economic growth compose the state
space of the model, altering price dynamics relative to the full information bench-
mark. Beliefs about expected economic growth respond more sluggishly to shocks
in the limited information economy because noise obscures the true conditional
growth rate. When investors’ information sets about the state diverge, the risk
price for long-run news about economic growth becomes small and inconsequen-
tial. The implication is, at most, only a handful of basis points can separate the
most optimistic and pessimistic investors’ private beliefs about economic growth in
order for long-run risks to serve as a source of risk premium. Consumption growth
forecasts from professional forecasters exhibit a level of cross-sectional dispersion
that is counterfactually large relative to the model. As investors information sets
converge toward the truth, the risk price for long-run shocks increases toward the
full information limit. Risk prices exhibit large countercylicalility as investor be-
liefs grow more accurate. This happens because the precision of investors’ private
signals increases during periods of high volatility in economic aggregates and asset
prices. This paper attempts to take heterogeneous beliefs seriously in an econ-
omy with long-run risks, and shows disagreement is a challenge for this literature,
opening new empirical targets for the model.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response functions for the hierarchy of expectations Xt from
a two standard deviation shock to εx,t (top), εc,t (middle), and εd,t (bottom). On
the top graph, the thick dark blue line represents x(0)t , but this variable is absent
from the other two graphs because it does not respond to consumption or dividend
shocks. The increasingly lighter shades of turquoise and green correspond to higher
orders of expectations. The level of noise is calibrated to ϕs = 2ϕx.
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Figure 2.8: The top plot exhibits a simulation of the expectations hierarchy for
T = 100 periods. The first fifty periods are low volatility states, and the last
fifty periods are high volatility. A vertical dashed line separates the two regimes.
The bottom plot shows the interquartile range of consumption growth forecasts.
Each period, I randomly sample N = 50 independent draws to simulate a panel
of forecasts. I then estimate the 25th and 75th percentiles and compute their
difference.
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Figure 2.9: Cross-sectional dispersion of annual real nondurable consumption
growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The forecast data
are sampled at a quarterly frequency, beginning in the third quarter of 1981 and
ending in the fourth quarter of 2015. I compute annual consumption growth for
each forecaster in the sample by subtracting their forecast of the previous period
revised log consumption level from the level forecasted four quarters ahead of the
end of the measurement period.
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CHAPTER 3
AMBIGUITY OVER THE LONG-RUN: THE WELFARE COSTS OF
PERSISTENT GROWTH SHOCKS
48
3.1 Introduction
Mehra and Prescott [1985] demonstrate a simple model of a representative agent
with power utility cannot replicate the size of the equity premium. A subsequent
literature seeks to “solve” the equity premium puzzle by enriching economic models
to match the statistical moments of asset price data. Generally, this literature fo-
cuses on two paths to refining such a model. First, one can equip a representative
agent with exotic preferences, with the goal in mind of increasing the flexibility
to the stochastic discount factor to better price risky streams of payoffs. Ideally,
the preference specification and parameter values are corroborated by an economic
theory and microeconomic evidence. Second, and typically in combination with an
exotic preference specification, one can augment the exogenous stochastic process
driving consumption growth with different types of risks. The model of consump-
tion growth should be supported by a basic econometric calibration with a time
series of observed aggregate consumption data. Despite the variety of preferences
and risks in structural asset pricing models, most share a common assumption that
agents inhabit in a world with rational expectations. That is, the representative
agent knows the correct risk model of consumption growth, and prices risky payoffs
with the correct model.
Using the framework Barillas et al. [2009], I take a different route, a route where
the representative agent has the correct risk model of consumption growth in mind
as an approximating model, but is uncertain of the model’s validity. To surmount
model uncertainty, she employs a robust risk model by choosing the worst-case
probability distribution of consumption growth subject to an entropy constraint.
The entropy constraint dictates the worst-case model cannot be “too far” from the
approximating model in a statistical sense–one cannot arbitrarily expect tomorrow
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to be armaggedon with probability one if a simple statistical test suggests such a
model is near the realm impossibility. The result of this exercise is an ability to
robustly price risky assets under a pessimistic view of consumption risk. If assets
are priced in this way, what share of the risk premium on common stocks can
be attributed to model uncertainty? How much would an economic agent pay to
absolve themself from model uncertainty? In particular, I seek answers to these
questions with an updated model of consumption growth having both long-run
risks (LRR) of Bansal and Yaron [2004] and rare disasters of Barro [2006].
The LRR literature conjectures consumption growth has both a persistent com-
ponent and stochastic volatility. When paired with the preferences of Epstein and
Zin [1989] (EZ), a LRR model of consumption growth does a good job matching
key statistical moments of asset price data. A caveat is Bansal and Yaron rely on
a value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) to be larger than one,
which conflicts with some earlier estimates, like Hall [1988], who estimates IES to
be approximately one half. The IES is a theoretical parameter that regulates eco-
nomic agents willingness to substitute consumption over time, and subsequently
drives savings behavior. The implication for asset pricing being that, via a stan-
dard Euler equation relationship, fluctuations in the risk-free rate are amplified
fluctuations in consumption growth by a factor greater than one.
The rare disasters literature begins with Rietz [1988], who shows that the infre-
quent market crashes are capable of generating a large equity premium and a low
risk-free rate. Barro [2006] expands this literature by constructing a prolific panel
data set of global consumption growth that reaches back as far as 1790. With a
subsample of 35 countries over 100 years, Barro finds the probability of aggregate
consumption declining by 15 percent or more in a given year is 1.7 percent per
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year. Both Barro and Rietz rely on a simple asset pricing model where the repre-
sentative agent has time-separable power utility, and is subject to iid shocks. More
recent work in Barro [2009], Barro and Jin [2011], and Nakamura et al. [2013] dis-
card time-separable utility in favor of EZ preferences. Asset pricing models with
disasters and EZ pereferences, similar to the LRR literature, require a value of IES
to be greater than one.1
The paper that is most similar to this one is Bidder and Smith [2013]. However,
they focus on a consumption model with stochastic volatility, and without long-run
risks and rare disasters.
3.2 A Model of Consumption Growth
Consumption growth is indexed by discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and has the form,
4ct+1 = µ+ xt + εct+1 + εdt+1 (3.1)
xt+1 = ρxt + ε
x
t+1 (3.2)
εct+1 ∼i.i.d. N (0, σ2c ) (3.3)
εxt+1 ∼i.i.d. N (0, σ2x) (3.4)
εdt+1 ∼i.i.d. Bernoulli(pid) · log(1− b) (3.5)
where the notation 4ct+1 = ct+1 − ct is the first difference of logs and µ is the
trend growth rate. An uppercase letter Ct = exp(ct) is the exponent of the log
value. Rare disasters take two distinct values εdt+1 ∈ {0, log(1 − b)}, and follow a
1In an unpublished set of presentation slides, Viktor Tsyrennikov is to my knowledge the first
to apply the framework of Barillas et al. [2009] to a model of rare disasters.
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two-state Markov chain with a stationary distribution,
fd(εdt+1) = pi
εdt+1
log(1−b)
d (1− pid)1−
εdt+1
log(1−b) .
Taken together, the shocks are also represented as a vector εt+1,
εt+1 ≡

εdt+1
εct+1
εxt+1
 ∼ f ε(εt+1), (3.6)
where f ε(·) is the joint distribution function and εt+1 = (ε0, ε1, . . . , εt, εt+1).
3.3 Two Observationally Equivalent Agents
3.3.1 Type-I Agent with EZ Preferences
The type-I agent faces consumption growth (3.1)-(3.2) and has peferences of Ep-
stein and Zin [1989] and Tallarini [2000],
VI(st) = ct − βϑ logEt[exp(−VI(st+1)/ϑ)], (3.7)
where the utility paramter ϑ can be expressed as,
ϑ = − 1
(1− β)(1− γ) . (3.8)
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is a one-period time discount rate, γ > 0 is atemporal
risk aversion, and EIS is fixed equal to one. When γ > EIS, the type-I agent prefers
the early resolution of uncertainty. The state vector st consists of consumption ct
and the time-varying component of the growth rate xt,
st =
ct
xt
 . (3.9)
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By standard arguments, the stochastic discount factor of the type-I is,
Λt,t+1 = β
Ct
Ct+1
exp(−VI(st+1)/ϑ)
Et[exp(−VI(st+1)/ϑ)] , (3.10)
and can be used to price any risky payoff. An advantages of fixing EIS equal to
one is that the value function has a closed-form solution. Simply guess the affine
form,
VI(st) = α0 + αcct + αxxt, (3.11)
and after some algebra, arrive at the solution,
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ
1− β −
( β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
)2 σ2x
2ϑ
− (3.12)( 1
1− β
)2 σ2c
2ϑ
− ϑ log
(
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
))
αc =
1
1− β (3.13)
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β) . (3.14)
3.3.2 Type-II Agent with Multiplier Preferences
The type-II agent faces consumption growth (3.1)-(3.2) and has multiplier prefer-
ences as in Hansen and Sargent [2001] and Barillas et al. [2009],
VII(s0) = min
mt+1
∞∑
t=0
E
[
βtMt
(
ct + βϑE
[
mt+1 ln(mt+1)|st
])
|st
]
(3.15)
where,
Mt+1 = mt+1Mt (3.16)
E[mt+1|εt, s0] = 1 (3.17)
mt+1 ≥ 0 (3.18)
M0 = 1, (3.19)
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with s0 given. This agent does not know the true probability distribution f ε(·) of
shocks. To deal with this concern, the type-II agent chooses a scalar mt+1 that
is Borel measurable with respect to (εt+1, s0). The choice of mt+1 minimizes the
agent’s lifetime expected utility, subject to an entropy constraint parameterized by
ϑ. Intuitively, this agent chooses a probability distribution for risks to consumption
growth that is the worst indistinguishable case. That is, it is very difficult for a
discerning econometrician to separate the worst-case distribution from the actual
data generating process with a relatively short time series of data. The recursively
defined sequence {Mt}∞t=0 of likelihood ratios is a non-negative martingale such
that,
E[Mt+1|εt, s0] = Mt. (3.20)
Therefore mt+1 is also known as the minimizing martingale increment. The likeli-
hood ratios {Mt}∞t=0 represent the distance between the type-II agent’s constrained
worst-case model and the approximating model (3.1)-(3.2).
After scaling by M , the same problem restated recursively is,
VII(s) = c+ min
m(ε)≥0
(
β
∫ (
m(ε)VII(s′) + ϑm(ε) log(m(ε))
)
f ε(ε)dε
)
(3.21)
where,
E[m(ε)] = 1. (3.22)
Solving for the minimizer mˆt+1(st+1) and substituting it back into the Bellman
equation (3.21) yields,
VII(st) = ct − βϑ logEt[exp(−VII(st+1)/ϑ)], (3.23)
with the minimizing martingale increment,
mˆt+1(st+1) =
exp(−VII(st+1)/ϑ)
Et[exp(−VII(st+1)/ϑ)] . (3.24)
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3.3.3 The Worst-Case Probability Distribution
The minimizing martingale increment (3.24) is proportional to,
mˆt+1(εt+1) ∝ exp
(
− 1
ϑ(1− β)ε
c
t+1−
1
ϑ(1− β)ε
d
t+1−
β
ϑ(1− βρ)(1− β)ε
x
t+1
)
. (3.25)
To arrive at the worst-case distribution f˜ ε(·), the joint distribution of the approx-
imating model f ε(·) is simply multiplied by the distortion,
f˜ ε(εt+1) ∝ mˆt+1(εt+1)f ε(εt+1). (3.26)
Under the worst-case distribution, the locations of the transient consumption shock
and the persistent shock shift downward,
εct+1 ∼ N
(
− σ
2
c
ϑ(1− β) , σ
2
c
)
(3.27)
εxt+1 ∼ N
(
− βσ
2
x
ϑ(1− βρ)(1− β) , σ
2
x
)
. (3.28)
And, the disaster risk probability is slightly higher,
fd(εdt+1) ∝
(
e−
log(1−b)
ϑ(1−β) pid
) εdt+1
log(1−b)
(
1− pid
)1− εdt+1
log(1−b)
. (3.29)
Evidently, the type-II agent’s pessism is reflected in their choice of mˆt+1.
3.4 Thought Experiments
How much consumption would the type-I agent forgo each period to eliminate
different components of physical risk from (3.1)-(3.2)? To answer this question,
one needs the value function (3.11) for the type-I agent under (3.1)-(3.2), in addi-
tion to a value function solved under a less-risky process for consumption growth.
Equating these two value functions permits one to solve for consumption under
55
the less-risky process. The difference in these two consumption allocations is how
much the type-I agent would pay to eliminate physical risk. To perform this anal-
ysis, consider the following four processes for consumption growth that eliminate
different sources of physical risk, and are all equal in expectation to (3.1)-(3.2).
No Short-Run Risks :
4ct+1 = µ+ 1
2
σ2c + xt + ε
d
t+1 (3.30)
xt+1 = ρxxt + ε
x
t+1 (3.31)
No Long-Run Risks:
4ct+1 = µ+ εct+1 + εdt+1 (3.32)
No Disasters:
4ct+1 = µ+ pid log(1− b) + xt + εct+1 (3.33)
xt+1 = ρxxt + ε
x
t+1 (3.34)
No Risk:
4ct+1 = µ+ 1
2
σ2c + pid log(1− b) (3.35)
Let j ∈ {c,x,d} index the type of physical risk, and the value function with risk
j eliminated is VIj(·). Then the compensating variation c0− cI0,j for a type-I agent
eliminating risk j can be found by solving,
VI(c0) = V
I
j(c
I
0,j). (3.36)
A type-II agent has the same value function as a type-I agent, so cI0,j = cII0,j. For a
type-I agent, c0 − cI0,j is compensation for risk, while for a type-II agent, c0 − cII0,j
56
is compensation for both risk and uncertainty. The principle difference between
these two quantities is their expression in terms of β and γ for a type-I agent or ϑ
for a type-II agent.
A type-II agent who does not fear model misspecification has ϑ = +∞ (or
γ = 1). The compensating variation for this type of agent after eliminating physical
risk is,
c0 − cII0,j(r) = lim
ϑ→∞
(c0 − cII0,j). (3.37)
The compensating variation for model uncertainty cII0,j(r)− cII0 can then be solved
for with the following decomposition,
c0 − cII0,j = (c0 − cII0,j(r)) + (cII0,j(r)− cII0,j). (3.38)
As Table 1 and Table 2 show, the representative agent is willing to pay more
to resolve ambiguity surrounding rare disasters relative to long-run risks. Figure
1 drives this point home best:
Figure 3.1: The lines represent the share of consumption the representative agent
is willing to forgo to absovle ambiguity surrounding a specific type of physical risk
for a given level of γ.
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3.5 Conclussion
The structural asset pricing literature has long sought to explain statistical mo-
ments of aggregate asset price fluctuations with models of full information rational
expectations. While these models are critically important benchmarks for measur-
ment, in reality the agents who set the prices on risky assets do not all share a
common risk model for a fixed set of underlying physical risks. A more realistic
approach acknowledges that the true underyling risks are ambiguous to economic
agent, and that agents must somehow make the best possible decisions nonetheless.
Two models of consumption growth have come to dominate the recent literature of
structural explanations of the equity premium, long-run risks and rare disasters.
I cast both of these models in a theoretical world where the representative agent
does not know the true stochastic processes for these two sources of risk, but be-
haves optimally by assuming a worst-case joint distribution that would be difficult
to reject with real data. A subsequent welfare analysis reveals that the representa-
tive agent would be willing to forgo a relatively larger share of their consumption
each period for the rest of their infinite life to remove ambiguity surrounding rare
disasters relative to ambiguity surrounding long-run risks.
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CHAPTER 4
NEWS UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT
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4.1 Introduction
The budding literature on news shocks shows economic agents’ response to antic-
ipated changes in an economy accounts for a substnatial share of macroeconomic
fluctuations. I contribute to the conversation on news shocks with a model where
news uncertainty, defined as the second moment of the stochastic process gener-
ating news shocks, is allowed to randomly fluctuate over time. Intuitively, this
models exogenous, time-varying changes in agents’ level of certainty of news about
future outcomes. In this paper, I focus on news uncertainty shocks to total factor
productivity (TFP) and interest rates in a small open economy. I show that the
magnitude of an economy’s response to news uncertainty shocks is positively re-
lated to the length of time before news shocks realization in the level, and that an
economy’s response to news uncertainty can eclipse the response to contempora-
neous volatility shocks.1
Why are news uncertainty shocks a valid modelling decision? First, consider
the data. A news shock to interest rates in the context of an open economy can
be interpreted as a shock to the level of a forward rate. Thus, time-varying news
uncertainty is equivalent to conditional heteroskedasticity in forward rates. Figure
4.1 displays the first differences of the two year forward rate on German Bunds. I
use this particular time series because in an open economy DSGE, a shock to the
level of interest rates eight quarters in the future is equivalent to a shock to the two
year forward rate. As the plot shows, throughout the financial crisis, innovations to
the forward rate are large, though they substantially attenuate beginning around
2012.
1There are many different interesting applications for news uncertainty shocks not studied in
this paper, in particular, fiscal policy.
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Figure 4.1: Time series plot of first difference of 2 year forward swap rates on
German sovereign debt with a 3 month tenor. Time observations are at a quarterly
frequency.
Figure 4.2 displays the estimated time series of TFP news shocks using the
identification scheme of Barsky and Sims [2011] and the matlab code and data
of Kurmann and Otrok [2013]. Here, a TFP news shock is defined to be a shock
orthogonal to a conventional TFP shock that accounts for the largest share of
variation in future TFP. News about TFP is anemic in the 1960’s, as well as the
1990’s and 2000s. The variance of TFP news is noticeable larger throughout the
1970’s and 1980’s. A Ljung-Box test of the squared TFP news shock time series
yields strong evidence of conditional heteroskedisticity.2
2The Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test, meaning it does not provide a sharp definition
of an alternative hypothesis. Further, conditional heteroskedasticity may disappear under future
identification schemes for TFP news shocks. I take the TFP argument from the empirical angle
with a grain of salt, and wish to point out that homoskedasticity was a natural assumption to
initiate studies of economic models with news shocks, though it may be more difficult to justify
against robust alternatives in the wake of advancing numerical methods that are evermore easier
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Figure 4.2: Partially identified time series of news shocks to TFP in the United
states at a quarterly frequency, 1959-2005.
The recent literature on news shocks begins with Cochrane [1994] arguing that
a bundle of standard contemporaneous shocks to money and TFP are unable to
account for a majority of economic fluctuations, and that econometric models in-
corporating shocks to anticipated levels of fundamentals may serve as a plausible
candidate for increasing statistical explanatory power. Beaudry and Portier [2006]
create an identification scheme for news shocks to TFP for a VAR with U.S. data,
and show that news shocks may account for approximately 50% of the fluctua-
tions in consumption, investment, and hours worked at business cycle frequencies.
Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009] create a real business cycle model where households
observe news about TFP and investment technology, which can replicate recession
dynamics resulting from lackluster news, and not negative TFP shocks. Barsky
to implement.
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and Sims [2011] further construct a novel identification scheme for news shocks,
and similarly show that news shocks are accountable for around 50% of fluctuations
in key economic aggregates.
Section 2 of the paper describes the model in detail. Sections 3 and 4 are the
calibration and solution technique. Section 5 is a discussion of the results, and
section 6 concludes.
4.2 Model
There is a small open economy populated by a representative household with re-
cursive preferences of Epstein and Zin [1989] and Weil [1990], with flow utility of
Greenwood et al. [1988] (GHH),
Vt =
((
Ct − Γt−1 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βR
1−1/ψ
t
) 1
1−1/ψ
(4.1)
R1−γt = Et
[
V1−γt+1
]
, (4.2)
where Rt is the continuation value. Time is discrete, indexed by the non-negative
integers. The household procures utility with consumption Ct of a homogenous
good, and forfeits utility by working hours ht. The parameter ν > 0 determines
the elasticity of the household’s labor supply to wages. Three parameters govern
the household’s attitudes toward time and uncertainty: ψ is the inter temporal
elasticity of substitution, γ is risk aversion, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a one period time
discount rate. 3
As in Aguiar and Gopinath [2007], the embedded GHH flow utility function is
3The notation Vt represents the household’s value function at time t, which is clarified further
in the appendix.
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augmented with a stochastic process for cumulative growth,
Γt = e
gtΓt−1 (4.3)
with growth shocks following an AR(1) process,
gt = (1− ρg)µg + ρggt−1 + ηgεgt , εgt ∼ N (0, 1). (4.4)
I induce stationarity in the model by dividing quantities in time t by the lagged
value of cumulative growth, Γt−1. For example, the stationary transformation of
the utility function is,
Vt =
Vt
Γt−1
(4.5)
Rt = Rt
Γt−1
, (4.6)
which yields,
Vt =
((
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βegt(1−1/ψ)R1−1/ψt
) 1
1−1/ψ
(4.7)
R1−γt = Et
[
V 1−γt+1
]
. (4.8)
I write stationary variables lowercase, with the exeption of the two utility variables
in this example. Hereafter, all equations I introduce are stationary.
The household’s objective is to maximize lifetime expected utility subject to a
flow budget constraint,
ct + it + bt − e
gtbt+1
1 + ert
+
ϕba
2
(
egtbt+1 − b
)2
≤ wtht + qtkt + dt. (4.9)
In every period t, it may choose consumption ct, hours worked ht, investment it,
and holdings of international risk-free bonds bt+1. Deviations of bond holdings
from steady state b incur quadratic adjustment costs, scaled by the parameter ϕba.
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The household participates in a competitive labor market, and earns a wage wt
per each unit of labor it sells to the representative firm. It also participates in a
competitive capital market, and earns a rental rate qt per each unit of capital lent.
Any profits earned by the firm are transferred back to the household as a dividend
dt in the same period.
The investment good and consumption good are equivalent, and may be cost-
lessly and instantaneously transformed into one another. Capital is durable and
may be stored for future use, though it depreciates at a constant rate of δ per
period and is subject to quadratic adjustment costs,
egtkt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it − ϕka
2
(
egtkt+1
kt
− eµg
)2
kt, (4.10)
scaled by the parameter ϕka.
Financial markets are incomplete– the household may borrow or lend with a
single risk free bond at the exogenous interest rate 1+ert , which I assume is driven
by stochastic processes,
rt = ρrε
r
t−1 + e
σrt εrt , ε
r
t ∼ N (0, 1) (4.11)
σrt = (1− ρσr)µσ
r
+ ρσrσ
r
t−1 + η
σrεσ
r
t , ε
σr
t ∼ N (0, 1) (4.12)
ert = er¯ + rt . (4.13)
The first order necessary conditions of consumption and labor choices in the
household’s utility maximization problem give rise to two equations,
λt = V
1/ψ
t
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)−1/ψ
(4.14)
λtwt = V
1/ψ
t h
ν−1
t
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)−1/ψ
(4.15)
where λt is a Lagrange multiplier for the household’s flow budget constraint.
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In period t, the household values payoffs in period t + 1 with a stochastic
discount factor,
Λt,t+1 = βe
−gt/ψλt+1
λt
(
Rt
Vt+1
)γ−1/ψ
. (4.16)
First order conditions for bond holdings and investment give rise to two Euler
equations,
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
1
ϕb(bt+1 − b) + 1/1+ert
)]
(4.17)
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
ϕk
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1− δ + ϕka
2
((
egtkt+2
kt+1
)2
− e2µg
))
− ϕk
(
egtkt+1
kt
− eµg
)]
(4.18)
The private sector is populated by a profit maximizing representative firm,
which purchases labor and rents capital from the household in order to produce
the consumption good. Output of the representative firm follows a Cobb-Douglas
type production function,
yt = e
ztkϕkt (e
gtht)
ϕh , (4.19)
where I restrict ϕk +ϕh = 1 to ensure constant returns to scale. The level of total
factor productivity (TFP) is given by a stationary stochastic process ezt , where,
zt = ρzzt−1 + eσ
z
t εzt , ε
z
t ∼ N (0, 1). (4.20)
σzt = (1− ρσz)µσ
z
+ ρσzσ
z
t−1 + η
σzεσ
z
t , ε
σz
t ∼ N (0, 1) (4.21)
Both markets for labor and capital are competitive, hence the first order necessary
conditions of profit maximization also price these factors, respectively,
wt = ϕh
yt
ht
(4.22)
qt = ϕk
yt
kt
. (4.23)
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I assume two transversality conditions for capital and bonds, which taken together
with the Euler equations, are sufficient conditions for the existence of a maximum
to the household’s problem:
lim
t→∞
βtλt+1bt+1 = 0 (4.24)
lim
t→∞
βtλt+1kt+1 = 0 (4.25)
4.2.1 Two Types of News Shocks
In period t, the household observes a news shock [news]t+τt that effects the level of
an exogenous stochastic process in period t+ τ ,
σnt = (1− ρσn)µσ
n
+ ρσnσ
n
t−1 + η
σnεσ
n
t , ε
σn
t ∼ N (0, 1) (4.26)
[news]t+τt = e
σnt εnt ε
n
t ∼ N (0, 1) (4.27)
where the volatility of news shocks follows an AR(1) process. The first moment
of the news shock process follows Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009], equation (4.26) is
novel component. I write the vector containing all observed news shocks at time t
as newst, and more explicitly as equation (C.3).
News about the Interest Rate
In the first model, I add news shocks to the stochastic process for interest rates at
time horizons 4 quarters and 8 quarters prior to realization in the level,
rt = ρrε
r
t−1 + e
σrt εrt + [news]
t+4
t + [news]
t+8
t , ε
r
t ∼ N (0, 1). (4.28)
Thus in every period t, the household observes two news shocks: a distant shock
two years away, and a revision shock to a news shock which was initially observed
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one year before. Both shocks occurring in period t share a common distribution,
so a volatility shock to news jointly increases the scale of both the distant and
revision shocks.
News about TFP
In the second model, I add news shocks at the same horizons to the process for
TFP,
zt = ρzzt−1 + eσ
z
t εzt + [news]
t+4
t + [news]
t+8
t , ε
z
t ∼ N (0, 1). (4.29)
4.2.2 Steady State
I label steady state quantities by omitting the time subscript. To compute the
steady state, first, I solve for capital as a function of labor by combining the
household first order conditions for labor and consumption with the firm’s first
order condition for labor. Then, I substitute out labor in the Euler equation for
capital, which yields the steady state level of capital in terms of given parameters,
k =
((
Λ−1 − 1− δ
)(
ϕhe
µgϕh
(
ϕke
µgϕh
) ϕh
ν−ϕh
)−1) 1ϕk−1+ϕkϕhν−ϕh . (4.30)
The steady state level of capital is then used to solve for labor with the previously
established relationship,
h =
(
ϕhe
µgϕhkϕk
) 1
ν−ϕh . (4.31)
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Having the steady state levels of capital and labor in hand, the solutions for the
remaining variables are straightforward:
y = kϕk
(
eµgh
)ϕh (4.32)
r¯ = ln
(
Λ−1 − 1) (4.33)
i =
(
eµg − 1 + δ)k (4.34)
c = y − i− b+ b
1 + er¯
(4.35)
V =
c− 1
ν
hν(
1− βµg(1−1/ψ)) 11−1/ψ (4.36)
R = V (4.37)
λ = V
1/ψ
(
c− 1
ν
hν
)1−1/ψ (4.38)
4.3 Calibration
Table 4.1 presents the calibration of the model economy, which closely resembles
Argentina in Fernández-Villaverde et al. [2011]. Parameters are scaled such that
one period in the model corresponds to one quarter in calendar time. I set the
labor elasticity constant to ν = 1000, so the household’s labor response to an
interest rate shock is small and negative. The sign of γ − 1/ψ determines the
household’s attitude toward the resolution of uncertainty over expected utility
outcomes. In the case γ − 1/ψ > 0, the household prefers an early resolution to
uncertainty. If γ = 1/ψ, equations (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent to time separable
GHH preferences. And lastly, if γ < 1/ψ, the household prefers the resolution of
uncertainty later, rather than sooner. Because γ − 1/ψ = 6 > 0, the household is
averse to increased uncertainty in expected future utility outcomes.
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Description Parameter Value
Discount Rate β 0.980
Depreciation δ 0.014
Risk Aversion γ 8
Labor Elasticity Constant ν 1000
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution ψ 0.500
Steady State Bond Holdings b 6
Average Real Interest Rate r¯ 0.019
Capital Share ϕk 0.320
Labor Share ϕh 0.680
Bond Adjustment Cost Scale ϕba 1.75e-3
Capital Adjustment Cost Scale ϕka 6
TFP Persistence ρz 0.950
TFP Volatility µσz ln(0.0075)
TFP Volatility Persistence ρσz 0.950
TFP Volatility of Volatility ησz 0.300
Long Run Growth Rate µg ln(1.0048)
Growth Persistence ρg 0.200
Growth Volatility ηg 0.015
Interest Rate Persistence ρr 0.950
Interest Rate Volatility of Volatility ησr 0.150
Interest Rate Volatility µσr -6
Interest Rate Volatility Persistence ρσr 0.950
News Volatility µσn
News about rt ln(0.0075)
News about zt -6
News Volatility Persistence ρσn 0.950
News Volatility of Volatility ησn
News about rt 0.100
News about zt 0.150
Table 4.1: Parameter values for the model calibration. All parameters are scaled
to a quarterly frequency and are values for Argentina used in Fernández-Villaverde
et al. [2011].
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4.4 Solution
Models of dynamic economies with stochastic volatility necessitate a solution ac-
curate to the third order or higher. First order approximations are certainty equiv-
alent, hence the resulting policy functions are invariant to disturbances in second
moments of the shocks driving the model. Second order solutions capture only
interaction terms between shocks. Therefore, I use a perturbation technique to
estimate policy functions accurate to the third order.
Impulse response functions generated by higher order approximations require
additional care beyond what is typically desired for first order solutions. Simply
iterating the policy functions is liable to generate explosive paths for the economy.
This happens because, given the recursive structure of the model, it is possible for
simulated paths to depend upon orders of state variables higher than three. And
these higher order dependencies bias the model, though pruning algorithms are
capable of removing such nuisance terms and restoring policy stability. I use the
pruning algorithm of Andreasen et al. [2013].
The logic for utilizing the deterministic steady state to initiate analyses of
impulse response functions holds for first order solutions, owing to certainty equiv-
alence. If optimal solutions are equivalent in both the stochastic and deterministic
cases, simply initiate the stochastic economy from the deterministic equilibrium.
Fernández-Villaverde et al. [2011] argue the loss of certainty equivalence that comes
with higher order approximations is likely to drive simulated paths of an economy
away from steady state in the long run, and thus propose an alternative technique
addressing this fact. I use their algorithm to generate impulse responses, which
goes as follows: the first step is to simulate the economy for 2096 periods beginning
from the steady state. I discard the first 2000 observations as burn-in, and then
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compute the ergodic mean for the economy with the remaining 96 observations.
Next, beginning at the ergodic mean, for each shock I separately initiate a one
standard deviation impulse and iterate the economy forward 36 quarters.
Figure 4.3 displays plots of the bond policy functions approximated to three
distinct orders of accuracy, simulated for 100 periods beginning at the ergodic
mean. First, observe the ergodic mean of debt is indeed lower than the determin-
istic steady state. The second and third order accurate policies move in lockstep,
however, notice that by the end of the 100 periods, the first order accurate policy
deviates to a level more than 50% above the other two policies.
4.5 Discussion of Results
Figures C.1 and C.2 display impulse response functions for the model with news
uncertainty shocks about the interest rate. Rows are indexed by endogenous vari-
ables, and columns by shocks. The vertical axes are scaled in percentage deviations
from the ergodic mean, and horizontal axes measure time in quarters. For each
displayed endogenous variable, a one standard deviation shock is realized in the
first period. Recall a news shocks is first observed 8 quarters prior to its real-
ization in the level, and then revision shocks subsequently occur 4 and 8 periods
later. The column for news shocks has horizontal dotted lines at 4 and 8 quarters
to highlight these points in time. The initial impulse to the news shock may be
interpreted as the household learning about an uncertain anticipated change to the
level occurring 8 periods ahead. Revision shocks after 4 and 8 periods are zero,
thus what the household initially anticipates comes to pass. Like GHH preferences,
the labor decision arising from GHH-EZ pereferences is immunized from wealth
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Figure 4.3: Policy functions for bond holdings over a 100 period simulation. Line
colors correspond to the order of the perturbation method used- red is accurate to
the first order, green is second, and blue is third. The finely dotted horizontal line
at 6 is the steady state level of bond, and the line with thicker dashes below is the
ergodic mean.
effects driven by changes in the interest rates. In both models with news shocks to
interest rates and TFP, the labor decisions are non-factors in explaining the model
dynamics.
For a shock to news uncertainty, output falls by a mere 2 basis points. Con-
sumption falls by nearly 20 basis points, which is offset by declines in both invest-
ment and bond holdings. The response patterns endogenous variables exhibit to
a news uncertainty shock are generally mirrored by shocks to interest rate volatil-
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ity, although the magnitudes of declines are smaller for consumption and bond
holdings. Both news shocks and contemporaneous level shocks additively feed the
process for interest rates, and it stands to reason that shocks to these processes’
second moments generate similar dynamics. So, what then drives the difference in
the magnitudes? Figure 4.4 displays how sovereign bond responds to news uncer-
tainty shocks about the interest rate at different time horizons τ ∈ {1, 4, 8, 12},
εrt = ρrε
r
t−1 + e
σrt εrt + [news]
t+τ
t . (4.39)
As the plot shows, the magnitude of response to a news uncertainty shock is
increasing in the time horizon of news.
Adding more intermediate revision shocks also increases the magnitude of the
economy’s response, because this increases the volatility of the underlying stochas-
tic process. For instance, suppose news shocks arrive eight periods in the future,
news uncertainty is highly persistent, and there are seven intermediate revision
shocks to news in period before the incorporation of news in the level. A large
positive shock to news uncertainty forebodes a high degree of variation in the
subsequent seven revisions.
Figures C.3 and C.4 display impulse response functions for the model with news
uncertainty shocks to TFP. Output rises by not even a basis point. Consumption
falls 6 basis points and bond holdings fall 15 basis points, and the savings are used
to fund increased investment. Despite the small magnitudes, the response of news
uncertainty relative to a TFP volatility shock is threefold for consumption and
bond holdings.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse response functions for sovereign bond holdings responding to a
one standard error news uncertainty shock when the news is 1, 4, 8, and 12 periods
in the future. The dark indigo line with the largest response corresponds to news
12 periods ahead, the blue line to news 8 periods ahead, and so on.
4.6 Conclusion
News uncertainty shocks are important. In a small open economy, shocks to news
uncertainty about the intererst rate generate large responses in bond holdings,
investment, and consumption. News uncertainty about TFP plays a lesser role,
generating meager responses in bond holdings and consumption. One glaring omis-
sion from this paper is the application of news uncertainty shocks to fiscal policy,
which might be an interesting avenue for future research. Further, are news un-
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certainty shocks positively correlated with contemporaneous volatility shocks? If
yes, to what degree are responses amplified? And how do news uncertainty shocks
effect asset pricing in a closed economy?
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
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Chapter 2 shows the quality of investors’ information sets shapes their be-
liefs about risk, and, in equilibrium, the price of that risk. A popular and well-
established literature argues a small, mean-reverting stochastic process that drives
average consumption and average dividend growth motivates the large historical
equity premium in the United States. That argument rests on investors being
able to perfectly observe the state of the growth rate at every point in time. In
reality, investors cannot, and I show that when their information sets are realisti-
cally challenged with noise, then the compensation for long-run risks is reduced to
an extent that it cannot explain the equity risk premium. I also present a novel
mechanism in the consumption-based asset pricing literature that can explain fea-
tures of the time-varying dispersion in consumption growth forecasts. Chapter 3
illustrates a related situation where a representative investor faces long-run risk
and rare disasters in their consumption endowment, but does not know the actual
probability distribution of these shocks. The agent estimates the worst-case distri-
bution for these risks subject to a constraint that their pessimistic beliefs must be
difficult to reject given the data. I find that the agent would give up a much larger
share of their lifetime consumption to remove ambiguity around rare disasters rel-
ative to long-run risks. Chapter 4 presents a novel theoretical source of risk in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model: news uncertainty shocks. This is
time-variation in the volatility of news shocks. When a small open economy is sub-
jected to a positive news uncertainty shock in their borrowing costs, that is, their
future interest rate becomes less certain, they will making meaningful adjustments
in aggregate consumption and deleverage.
To conclude, asset pricing models offer important insights to finance profes-
sional and everyday investors. Yet if they are founded upon the assumption that
agents have perfect information sets and form rational expectations consistent with
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nature, then asset pricing models risk generating results that match the data yet
fail to match reality. Economists are therefore tasked with creating realistic belief
structures for economic agents that can match both the data and our fundamental
understanding of how human beings metabolise risk and return. This is challeng-
ing work, and will have to continue to push methodological limits to create suitable
models for explaining the fundamental behavior of asset prices.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
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A.1 Law of Motion for Higher Order Beliefs
Investor i encounters the state-space system:
Xt = A(s
t)Xt−1 +B(st)
 εt
i,t
 (A.1)
Yi,t = µY (s
t) +C1(s
t)Xt +C2(s
t)Xt−1 +D(st)
 εt
i,t
 (A.2)
Define the conditional expectation of the state Xi,t|t ≡ Ei,t
[
Xt
]
. Applying the
Kalman filter of Nimark [2015] for a state space system with normal shocks and a
lagged state vector in the measurement equation, the conditional expectation may
be expressed:
Xi,t|t = A(st)Xi,t−1|t−1+
K(st)
(
Yi,t − µY (st)−
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)
Xi,t−1|t−1
)
(A.3)
Define the matrices Dε(st) and D:
Dε(s
t) =

0 0 0 0 0
0 ϕcσ(st+1) 0 0 0
0 ρcdϕcσ(st+1) ϕdσ(st+1) 0 0
0 0 0 ϕrm 0
0 0 0 0 ϕrf

(A.4)
D =

ϕs
0
0
0
0

(A.5)
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Let the subscript 1 denote the posterior, and 0 the prior. Then posterior covariance
matrix may be computed:
P1(s
t) = P0(s
t)−
K(st)
((
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)
P1(s
t−1)
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)′
+(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(s
t)
)(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(s
t)
)′
+DD
′

)
K(st)′ (A.6)
And the prior covariance matrix:
P0(s
t) = A(st)P1(s
t−1)A(st)′ +B(st)B(st)′ (A.7)
Lastly, the Kalman gain:
K(st) =(
A(st)P1(s
t−1)
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)′
+B(st)
(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(s
t)
)′)((
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)
P1(s
t−1)
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)′
+(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(s
t)
)(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(s
t)
)′
+DD
′

)−1
(A.8)
Integrating the posterior estimate of the state over the cross section of agents:
Xt|t ≡
∫ 1
0
Xi,t|tdi (A.9)
Which yields the infinite dimensional state transition equation for higher order
beliefs:
Xt|t =
(
A(st)−K(st)(C1(st)A(st) +C2(st)))Xt−1|t−1+
K(st)
(
C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t)
)
Xt−1 +K(st)
(
C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(st)
)
εt (A.10)
The state transition equation can be written as: xt
Xt|t
 = A(st)
 xt−1
Xt−1|t−1
+B(st)εt (A.11)
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To make the problem numerically tractable, I approximate the infinite dimensional
law of motion by choosing the first k¯ orders of expectations. I construct the
matrices A(st) and B(st) as follows:
A(st) =
ρx1×1 01×k¯
0
k¯×1
0
k¯×k¯
+
 01×1 01×k¯
0
k¯×1
[
A(st)−K(st)(C(st)A(st) +C2(st))]−
k¯×k¯
+
 01×k¯+1[
K(st)(C1(s
t)A(st) +C2(s
t))
]
−
k¯×k¯+1

(A.12)
B(st) =
 ϕx1×1 01×nε
0
nε×1
0
nε×nε
+
 01×nε+1[
K(st)(C1(s
t)B(st) +Dε(st))
]
−
1×nε+1
 (A.13)
where a minus subscript indicates orders of expectations greater than k¯ have been
dropped.
A.2 Deriving the Stochastic Discount Factor
Investor i solves the following utility maximization problem:
Vi,t = max
{Ci,t}
(
(1− β)C1−1/ψi,t + βEi,t
[
V 1−γi,t+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
(A.14)
subject to,
Wi,t+1 = Rc,t+1
(
Wi,t − Ci,t
)
(A.15)
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I conjecture Vi,t = $i,tWi,t and re-express the value function accordingly:
$i,tWi,t =
max
{Ci,t}
(
(1− β)C1−1/ψi,t + β
(
Wi,t − Ci,t
)1−1/ψEi,t[($i,t+1Rc,t+1)1−γ] 1−1/ψ1−γ ) 11−1/ψ
(A.16)
Re-arranging:
$
1−1/ψ
i,t = (1− β)
(
υi,t
)1−1/ψ
+ β
(
1− υi,t
)1−1/ψEi,t[($i,t+1Rc,t+1)1−γ] 1−1/ψ1−γ (A.17)
where υi,t = Ci,t/Wi,t. Taking the first order condition and solving for the conditional
expectation term:
Ei,t
[(
$i,t+1Rc,t+1
)1−γ] 1−1/ψ
1−γ =
1− β
β
(
1− υi,t
υi,t
)1/ψ
(A.18)
Substituing the first order condition (A.18) back into the objective function leads
to:
$i,t =
(
1− β) 11−1/ψ (υi,t) −1/ψ1−1/ψ (A.19)
Then I re-express the term inside the conditional expectation in terms of the
consumption-wealth ratio and the return on the consumption claim:
$i,t+1Rc,t+1 =
(
1− β) 11−1/ψ (υi,t+1) −1/ψ1−1/ψRc,t+1 (A.20)
I substitute the budget constraint in period t into the consumption-wealth ratio in
period t+ 1:
υi,t+1 =
4Ci,t+1
Rc,t+1
υi,t
1− υi,t (A.21)
where 4Ci,t+1 = Ci,t+1/Ci,t. Putting this back into the term inside the conditional
expectation:
$i,t+1Rc,t+1 =
(
1− β) 11−1/ψ(4Ci,t+1
Rc,t+1
υi,t
1− υi,t
) −1/ψ
1−1/ψ
Rc,t+1 (A.22)
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Now putting this back into the first order condition (A.18):
Ei,t
[(
1− β)ϑ(4Ci,t+1
Rc,t+1
υi,t
1− υi,t
)−ϑ/ψ
R1−γc,t+1
]
=
(
1− β
β
(
1− υi,t
υi,t
)1/ψ)ϑ
(A.23)
Simplifying provides:
Ei,t
[
βϑ4C−ϑ/ψi,t+1Rϑ−1c,t+1
]
= 1 (A.24)
Next, define the log stochastic discount factor for investor i as:
mi,t+1 ≡ ϑ log β − ϑ/ψ4ci,t+1 +
(
ϑ− 1)rc,t+1 (A.25)
The stochastic discount factor for the average agent aggregates over the cross-
section:
mt+1 ≡
∫
mi,t+1di (A.26)
A.3 Solving for Prices
A.3.1 Approximating Returns
I approximate the return on the aggregate consumption claim Rc,t+1 with by log-
linearizing the return function about a deterministic steady state pc ≡ logP −
logC. The one period real return of the consumtion claim is:
Rc,t+1 =
Pc,t+1 + Ct
Pc,t
(A.27)
Let rc,t+1 ≡ logRc,t+1. Taking logs of both sides:
rc,t+1 = log
(
Pc,t+1 + Ct
Pc,t
)
(A.28)
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After some intermediate algebraic manipulations:
rc,t+1 = log
(
Pt+1
Ct
+ 1
)
− log
(
Pt
Ct−1
)
+ log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
(A.29)
Denote 4ct+1 ≡ logCt+1− logCt and pct ≡ logPt− logCt−1. Then exponentiating
and taking logs yields:
rc,t+1 = log
(
exp(pct+1) + 1
)− pct +4ct+1 (A.30)
Taking the first order Taylor series expansion of the first term about pc:
log
(
exp(pct+1) + 1
) ≈ log(exp(pc) + 1)+ exp(pc)
exp(pc) + 1
(
pct − pc
)
(A.31)
Define the linearization constants:
κ0 ≡ log
(
exp(pc) + 1
)− pc exp(pc)
exp(pc) + 1
(A.32)
κ1 ≡ exp(pc)
exp(pc) + 1
(A.33)
Then the log return on the aggregate consumption claim is:
rc,t+1 = κ0 + κ1pct+1 − pct +4ct+1 (A.34)
By the same line of reasoning, the terms for log return on the aggregate dividend
claim:
κ0,m ≡ log
(
exp(pd) + 1
)− pd exp(pd)
exp(pd) + 1
(A.35)
κ1,m ≡ exp(pd)
exp(pd) + 1
(A.36)
And the log return on the aggregate dividend claim:
rm,t+1 = κ0 + κ1pdt+1 − pdt +4dt+1 (A.37)
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A.3.2 Price-Consumption Ratio
I solve for the price-consumption ratio with the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients. Begin with the Euler equation pricing the aggregate consumption claim:
0 = ϑ log β + ϑκ0 + ϑ
(
1− 1/ψ)µc + ϑ(1− 1/ψ)∫Ei,t[xt]di+
ϑ
(
κ1
∫
Ei,t[pct+1]di− pct
)
+ 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mt+1 + rc,t+1
)
di (A.38)
Substitute in the affine form of the price consumption ratio:
pct = g
pc
0 (s
t) + gpcx (s
t)′Xt (A.39)
This leads to:
0 = ϑ log β + ϑκ0 + ϑ
(
1− 1/ψ)µc + ϑ(κ1∫Ei,t[gpc0 (st+1)]di− gpc0 (st))+
ϑ
(
1− 1/ψ)∫Ei,t[xt]di+ ϑ(κ1∫Ei,t[gpcx (st+1)′Xt+1]di− gpcx (st)′Xt)
+ 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mt+1 + rc,t+1
)
di (A.40)
Evaluating expectations:
∫
Ei,t[gpcx (st+1)Xt+1]di =
(
pigpcx (s
t+1
1 )
′A(st+11 ) +
(
1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))HXt
(A.41)∫
Ei,t[gpc0 (st+1)]di = pigpc0 (st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpc0 (st+10 ) (A.42)
Matching coefficients reveals:
gpcx (s
t)′ =
(
1− 1/ψ)e′1H+ κ1(pigpcx (st+11 )′A(st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))H
(A.43)
And the intercept term is therefore:
gpc0 (s
t) = log β + κ0 +
(
1− 1/ψ)µc + κ1(pigpc0 (st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpc0 (st+10 ))+
pi/2ϑ
∫
Vari,t
(
γpc(st+11 )
′Zt+1
)
di+ (1−pi)/2ϑ
∫
Vari,t
(
γpc(st+10 )
′Zt+1
)
di (A.44)
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A.3.3 Price-Dividend Ratio
The Euler equation for the market return:
0 = ϑ log β +
(
ϑ− 1− ϑ/ψ)µc + (ϑ− 1)κ0 + κ0,m + µd+(
ϑ− 1− ϑ/ψ + ρd
)∫
Ei,t
[
xt
]
di+
(
ϑ− 1)(κ1∫Ei,t[pct+1]di− pct)+(
κ1,m
∫
Ei,t
[
pdt+1
]
di− pdt
)
+ 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mt+1 + rm,t+1
)
di (A.45)
I conjecture an affine form for the price-dividend ratio:
pdt = g
pd
0 (s
t) + gpdx (s
t)′Xt (A.46)
Then after taking expectations and substituting, the following equation must hold:
gpdx (s
t)′ =
(
ϑ− 1− ϑ/ψ + ρd
)
e′1H+(
ϑ− 1)(κ1(pigpcx (st+11 )′A(st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))H− gpcx (st)′)+
κ1,m
(
pigpdx (s
t+1
1 )
′A(st+11 ) +
(
1− pi)gpdx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))H (A.47)
With the constant term:
gpd0 (s
t) = ϑ log β +
(
ϑ− 1− ϑ/ψ)µc + (ϑ− 1)κ0 + κ0,m + µd+
κ1,m
(
pigpd0 (s
t+1
1 )+(1−pi)gpd0 (st+10 )
)
+
(
ϑ−1)(κ1(pigpc0 (st+11 )+(1−pi)gpc0 (st+10 ))−gpc0 (st))+
pi
∫
Vari,t
(
γpd(st+11 )
′Zt+1
)
di+ (1− pi)∫Vari,t(γpd(st+10 )′Zt+1)di (A.48)
A.3.4 Risk-Free Rate
We can solve for the risk-free rate with:
rf,t = −
∫
Ei,t[mt+1]di− 1/2
∫
Vari,t
(
mt+1
)
di (A.49)
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I conjecture:
rf,t = g
rf
0 (s
t) + grfx (s
t)′Xt (A.50)
Solving for rf,t yields:
rf,t = −
(
ϑ log β +
(
ϑ− 1)κ0 + (ϑ− ϑ/ψ − 1)µc)− ϑ(1− 1/ψ − 1/ϑ)∫Ei,t[xt]di−(
ϑ− 1)(κ1∫Ei,t[pct+1]di− pct)− 1/2∫Vari,t(mt+1)di (A.51)
The coefficient on higher order beliefs:
grfx (s
t)′ = −ϑ(1− 1/ψ − 1/ϑ)e′1H−(
ϑ− 1)(κ1(pigpcx (st+11 )′A(st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 ))H− gpcx (st)′) (A.52)
Which leaves us with an intercept term:
grf0 (s
t) = −ϑ log β − (ϑ− 1)κ0 − (ϑ− ϑ/ψ − 1)µc−(
ϑ− 1)(κ1(pigpc0 (st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpc0 (st+10 ))− gpc0 (st))−
pi
∫
Vari,t
(
γrf(st+11 )
′Zt+1
)
di− (1− pi)∫Vari,t(γrf(st+10 )′Zt+1)di (A.53)
A.4 Conditional Variances
In order to solve the equations for pdt, pct, and rf,t, I need to solve for three
conditional variances. This may be accomplished by recasting the state space
system to include aggregate shocks in the state vector, and then utilizing the
Kalman filter to compute the state conditional covariance matrix. Define the new
state vector Zt+1 as:
Zt+1 ≡
Xt+1
εt+1
 (A.54)
91
The new state space system can be described by the state transition equation:Xt+1
εt+1
 =
A(st+1)k¯+1×k¯+1 0k¯+1×nε
0
nε×k¯+1
0
nε×nε

Xt
εt
+
B(st+1)k¯+1×nε 0k¯+1×1
I
nε×nε
0
nε×1

 εt+1
i,t+1
 (A.55)
and the measurement equation:
xi,t+1
4ct+1
4dt+1
rm,t+1
rf,t

= µY (s
t+1)+

e′1
1×k¯+1
0
1×nε
0
1×k¯+1
ϕcσ(st+1)e
′
c
1×nε
0
1×k¯+1
(
ϕde
′
d + ρcdϕce
′
c
)
σ(st+1)
1×nε
κ1,mg
pd
x (s
t+1)′
1×k¯+1
(
ϕde
′
d + ρcdϕce
′
c
)
σ(st+1) + ϕrme
′
rm
1×nε
0
1×k¯+1
0
1×nε

Xt+1
εt+1
+

0
1×k¯+1
0
1×nε
e′1
1×k¯+1
0
1×nε
ρde
′
1
1×k¯+1
0
1×nε
ρde
′
1 − gpdx (st)
1×k¯+1
′
0
1×nε
grfx (s
t)′
1×k¯+1
ϕrfe
′
rf
1×nε

Xt
εt
+
[
0
ny×nε
ϕse
′
1
ny×1
] εt+1
i,t+1
 (A.56)
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where:
µY (s
t+1) ≡

0
µc
µd
κ0,m + κ1,mg
pd
0 (s
t+1)− gpd0 (st)
grf0 (s
t)

(A.57)
The conditional covariance matrix of the state in this system is:
PZ(s
t+1) ≡ Ei,t
[(
Zt+1 − Zt+1|t+1
)(
Zt+1 − Zt+1|t+1
)′] (A.58)
The conditional variances for the price-consumption ratio, price-dividend ratio,
and risk free rate are can be expressed as functions of Zt+1:
Vari,t
(
mt+1 + rc,t+1
)
= Vari,t
(
γpc(st+1)′Zt+1
)
(A.59)
Vari,t
(
mt+1 + rm,t+1
)
= Vari,t
(
γpd(st+1)′Zt+1
)
(A.60)
Vari,t
(
mt+1
)
= Vari,t
(
γrf(st+1)′Zt+1
)
(A.61)
where the vector for the price-consumption ratio is defined:
γpc(st+1) ≡

ϑκ1g
pc
x (s
t+1)
0
ϑ
(
1− 1/ψ)ϕcσ(st+1)
0
0
0

(A.62)
93
and the price-dividend ratio:
γpd(st+1) ≡

(
ϑ− 1)κ1gpcx (st+1) + κ1,mgpdx (st+1)
0(
ϑ− ϑ/ψ − 1 + ρcd
)
ϕcσ(st+1)
ϕdσ(st+1)
ϕrm
0

(A.63)
and lastly, the risk free rate:
γrf(st+1) ≡

(
ϑ− 1)κ1gpcx (st+1)
0(
ϑ− ϑ/ψ − 1)ϕcσ(st+1)
0
0
ϕrf

(A.64)
This variance operator conditions on the information set in period t, therefore the
next period volatility state st+1 is a random variable. Further, the conditional
variance is a mixture of normal distributions with constant mixing weights pi and
1− pi. By the properties of mixtures of normal distributions with constant mixing
weights, the conditional variance is a simple weighted average:
Vari,t
(
γpc(st+1)′Zt+1
) ≈
piVari,t
(
γpc(st+11 )
′Zt+1
)
+ (1− pi)Vari,t
(
γpc(st+10 )
′Zt+1
)
(A.65)
I approximate the variance by dropping the small mean correction terms in (A.65).
The impact of approximating conditional variances is negligible on the model,
because risk prices for volatility are close to zero with or without the cumbersome
mean corrections that necessitate solving the model on a large numerical grid over
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Xt. Using the approximation from (A.65) and the state covariance matrix (A.58),
the conditional covariance matrix for the price-consumption ratio is:
Vari,t
(
γpc(st+1)′Zt+1
)
=
piγpc(st+11 )
′PZ(st+11 )γ
pc(st+11 ) +
(
1− pi)γpc(st+10 )′PZ(st+10 )γpc(st+10 ) (A.66)
Similar experession hold for the conditional variances for the price-dividend ratio
and risk free rate.
A.5 Risk Premia
A.5.1 Deriving Risk Prices
To compute risk prices, begin with the stochastic discount factor in innovations
form:
mt+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
mt+1
]
di (A.67)
Define the expected value of the slope and intercepts of the price function:
∫
Ei,t
[
gpc0 (s
t+1)
]
di = pigpc0 (s
t+1
1 ) + (1− pi)gpc0 (st+10 ) (A.68)∫
Ei,t
[
gpcx (s
t+1)′Xt+1
]
di =
(
pigpcx (s
t+1
1 )
′A(st+11 ) + (1− pi)gpcx (st+10 )′A(st+10 )
)
HXt
(A.69)
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Dropping constants and substituting leads to:
mt+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
mt+1
]
di =(
ϑ− 1)κ1(gpc0 (st+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpc0 (st+1)]di)+(−γϕcσ(st+1)e′c + (ϑ− 1)κ1gpcx (st+1)′B(st+1))εt+1+(−γe′1(I−H)+ (ϑ− 1)κ1(gpcx (st+1)′A(st+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpcx (st+1)′A(st+1)H]di))Xt
(A.70)
This results in risk-prices for:
λε(s
t+1)′ ≡ (−γϕcσ(st+1)e′c + (ϑ− 1)κ1gpcx (st+1)′B(st+1))Σ(st+1)−1 (A.71)
λσ(s
t+1) ≡ (ϑ− 1)κ1(gpc0 (st+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpc0 (st+1)]di) (A.72)
λX(s
t+1)′ ≡ −γe′1
(
I−H)+ (ϑ− 1)κ1(gpcx (st+1)′A(st+1)− (A.73)∫
Ei,t
[
gpcx (s
t+1)′A(st+1)H
]
di
)
where I define the matrix Σ(st+1) such that:
Σ(st+1) ≡

ϕxσ(st+1) 0 0 0 0
0 ϕcσ(st+1) 0 0 0
0 0 ϕdσ(st+1) 0 0
0 0 0 ϕrm 0
0 0 0 0 ϕrf

(A.74)
The result is innovations to the stochastic discount factor may be written:
mt+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
mt+1
]
di ≡ λε(st+1)′Σ(st+1)εt+1 + λX(st+1)′Xt + λσ(st+1) (A.75)
96
A.5.2 Deriving Betas
To compute betas for the market return by exploiting the equation:
rm,t+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1
]
di =
κ1,m
(
pdt+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
pdt+1
]
di
)
+
(4dt+1 − ∫Ei,t[4dt+1]di) (A.76)
Define the expected value of the slope and intercepts of the price function:
∫
Ei,t
[
gpd0 (s
t+1)
]
di = pigpd0 (s
t+1
1 ) + (1− pi)gpd0 (st+10 ) (A.77)∫
Ei,t
[
gpdx (s
t+1)′Xt+1
]
di =
(
pigpdx (s
t+1
1 )
′A(st+11 )+ (A.78)
(1− pi)gpdx (st+10 )′A(st+10 )
)
HXt
Then the market return innovation can be expressed as:
rm,t+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1
]
di =(
κ1,mg
pd
x (s
t+1)′B(st+1) + ϕdσ(st+1)e′d
)
εt+1+
+
(
ρde
′
1
(
I−H)+ κ1,m(gpdx (st+1)′A(st+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpdx (st+1)′A(st+1)H]di))Xt+
+ κ1,m
(
gpd0 (s
t+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpd0 (st+1)]di) (A.79)
Which can be written in terms of betas:
rm,t+1 −
∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1
]
di = βε(s
t+1)Σ(st+1)εt+1 + βX(s
t+1)Xt + βσ(s
t+1) (A.80)
and are defined as:
βε(s
t+1) ≡ (ϕdσ(st+1)e′d + κ1,mgpdx (st+1)′B(st+1))Σ(st+1)−1 (A.81)
βx(s
t+1) ≡ ρde′1
(
I−H)+ κ1,m(gpdx (st+1)′A(st+1)− (A.82)∫
Ei,t
[
gpdx (s
t+1)′A(st+1)H
]
di
)
βσ(s
t+1) ≡ κ1,m
(
gpd0 (s
t+1)− ∫Ei,t[gpd0 (st+1)]di) (A.83)
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A.5.3 Equity Premium
The equity premium is the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and
the market return:∫
Ei,t
[
rm,t+1 − rf,t
]
di+
1
2
∫
Vari,t
(
rm,t+1
)
di = −
∫
Covi,t(mt+1, rm,t+1)di
(A.84)
Using equations (A.75) and (A.80), the covariance is straightforward:∫
Covi,t(mt+1, rm,t+1)di =
∫
Ei,t
[
λε(s
t+1)′Σ(st+1)εt+1ε′t+1Σ(st+1)
′βε(st+1)
]
di
(A.85)
which implies risk premia may be computed by:
−
∫
Covi,t(mt+1, rm,t+1)di = −piλε(st+11 )′Σ(s1)Σ(s1)′βε(st+11 )−
(1− pi)λε(st+10 )′Σ(s0)Σ(s0)′βε(st+10 ) (A.86)
A.6 Numerical Algorithm
For a given steady state (pd, pc) and truncated volatility history st ∈ S(τ), the
model solution is a fixed point to the equations:
• State space system: (2.29), (2.30)
• Prices: (A.43), (A.44), (A.47), (A.48), (A.52), (A.53)
• Conditional covariance matrices: (A.58)
The procedure is as follows:
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1. Fix a choice for k¯, the order of expectations, and τ , the number of lagged
states to use.
(a) Construct a set of indexes J : S(τ)→ N for every truncated history in
st ∈ S(τ).
2. Choose a small error tolerance ξ > 0, preferably close to 1× 10−12.
3. Given Θ, compute the steady states
(
pc, pd
)
by solving the equations:
E
[
pc− gpc0 (st)
]
= 0 (A.87)
E
[
pd− gpd0 (st)
]
= 0 (A.88)
such that max
{∥∥pc− gpc0 (st)∥∥,∥∥pd− gpd0 (st)∥∥} < ξ is satisfied. If |J | is large,
programming the objective function for the two steady state equations can
be cumbersome. Substituting the full information steady state is useful in
this condition if the approximation errors are small.
4. Iterate the Kalman filter over each history j ∈ J to find a fixed point for
(2.29), (2.30), (A.43), (A.47), (A.52), using the error tolerance ξ to check for
convergence of the matrices as in step 3. Convergence is faster if the Kalman
filter begins with a well educated guess.
5. Conditional on (2.29), (2.30), (A.43), (A.47), (A.52), iterate the Kalman
filter over each history j ∈ J to find a fixed point for (A.58) using the error
tolerance ξ to check for convergence.
6. Conditional on (2.29), (2.30), (A.43), (A.47), (A.52), iterate equations
(A.44), (A.48), (A.53) over each history j ∈ J using the error tolerance
ξ to check for convergence.
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A.7 An Estimation Procedure Utilizing Forecast Panel Data
A.7.1 Conditional Cross-Sectional Covariance Matrix
The conditional cross-sectional covariance matrix is defined:
Pi(s
t) ≡ Ei,t
[(
Ei,t
[
Xt
]− ∫Ej,t[Xt]dj)(Ei,t[Xt]− ∫Ej,t[Xt]dj)′] (A.89)
Expanding the deviations of investor i’s forecast from the aggregate:
Xi,t|t −Xt|t =(
A(st)−K(st)(C1(st)A(st) +C2(st)))(Xi,t−1|t−1 −Xt−1|t−1)+K(st)Di,t
(A.90)
The covariance matrices Pi(st) for all 2τ histories may be computed as a fixed
point of the following system of equations:
Pi(s
t) = (
A(st)−K(st)(C1(st)A(st) +C2(st)))Pi(st−1)·(
A(st)−K(st)(C1(st)A(st) +C2(st)))′+
K(st)DD
′
Kt(s
t)′ (A.91)
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A.7.2 Likelihood
The vector of measured variables Zt+1 is defined:
Zt+1 ≡

4ct+1
4dt+1
rm,t+1
rf,t
ft+2|t+1
nf (t+1)×1

(A.92)
Fix a finite sample of observations ZT =
{
Z1, Z2, . . . , ZT−1, ZT
}
for estimation of
the model. The dimension of the forecast vector nf (t + 1) is a function of time
due to the changing number of respondents in the SPF data each period. Let
ηt+1 ∼i.i.d. N
(
0, Inf (t+1)
)
be a vector of shocks driving individual forecasts:
ft+2|t+1 =
(
µc + e
′
1HXt+1
) · 1nf (t+1) +√e′1HPi(st+1)H′e1 · Inf (t+1)ηt+1 (A.93)
Then Zt+1 evolves according to the state-space system:
Xt+1 = A(s
t+1)Xt + B˜(s
t+1)
εt+1
ηt+1
 (A.94)
Zt+1 = µZ(s
t+1) +Q1(s
t+1)Xt+1 +Q2(s
t+1)Xt +R(s
t+1)
εt+1
ηt+1
 (A.95)
where the matrix R(st+1) is a combination of aggregate and forecast shock impact
matrices and B˜(st+1) is modified to accompany the forecast shocks:
R(st+1) ≡
Dε(st+1)− 0nY −1×nf (t+1)
0
nf (t+1)×nε
√
e′1HPi(st+1)H′e1 · Inf (t+1)
 (A.96)
B˜(st+1) ≡
[
B(st+1) 0
k¯+1×nf (t+1)
]
(A.97)
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The likelihood function can be evaluated with a prediction error decomposition:
logL(Θ, sT |ZT ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
(
2pi · dim(Zt) + log |Ω(st)|+ Z˜ ′tΩ(st)−1Z˜t
)
(A.98)
where Ω(st) ≡ E[Z˜tZ˜ ′t] is the covariance matrix associated with the innovation
vector Z˜t:
Ω(st) =
(
Q1(s
t)A(st) +Q2(s
t)
)
P˜0(s
t)
(
Q1(s
t)A(st) +Q2(s
t)
)′
+(
Q1(s
t)B˜(st) +R(st)
)(
Q1(s
t)B˜(st) +R(st)
)′ (A.99)
The innovation Z˜t ≡ Zt−Zt|t−1 may be computed with the law of iterated projec-
tions:
Z˜t = Zt − µZ(st)−
(
Q1(s
t)A(st) +Q2(s
t)
)
Xt−1|t−1 (A.100)
A.7.3 An Adaptive Markov Chain Monte Carlo Estimation
Procedure
• Choose an initial Θ(0) with prior PΘ(·) and a history sT(0) with prior Ps(·).
• Solve the model with Θ(0).
• For τ = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T :
– Randomly partition Θ(τ) into two blocks with equal numbers of param-
eters. For each block b = 1, 2:
∗ Draw a candidate vector Θ˜(τ),b ∼ N
(
Θ(τ−1),b,VΘ,b
)
.
∗ Solve the model for Θ˜(τ),b.
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∗ With probability
piΘ,b =
max
{
min
{ L(Θ˜(τ),b, sT(τ−1)|ZT )PΘ(Θ˜(τ−1),b)Ps(sT(τ−1)|Θ˜(τ),b)
L(Θ(τ−1), sT(τ−1)|ZT )PΘ(Θ(τ−1))Ps(sT(τ−1)|Θ(τ−1)) , 1
}
, 0
}
(A.101)
· Set Θ(τ) = Θ˜(τ),b
· Otherwise Θ(τ) = Θ(τ−1)
– Draw candidate s˜T(τ) ∼ Qs
(
sT(τ−1)|Θ(τ), ZT
)
∗ With probability
pis = max
{
min
{ L(Θ(τ), s˜T(τ)|ZT )Ps(s˜T(τ)|Θ(τ))
L(Θ(τ), sT(τ−1)|ZT )Ps(sT(τ−1)|Θ(τ)) , 1
}
, 0
}
(A.102)
· Set sT(τ) = s˜T(τ)
· Otherwise sT(τ) = sT(τ−1)
As in Nimark [2014], the proposal density Qs works by randomly changing each
observation in sT(τ) from one to zero (or zero to one) with a given probability
α = 0.05. The proposal covariance matrix VΘ can be computed as the empirical
covariance matrix of candidate parameters
{
Θ(0),Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(τ−2),Θ(τ−1)
}
multi-
plied by a small scaling constant a ∈ R+:
VΘ = aĈov(Θ,Θ) (A.103)
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A.8 Variance Decomposition of the Consumption Growth
Term Structure
Dependent Variable Independent Variable
Level Slope Curvature
x(0)t 0.922 0.073 0.005
x(1)t 0.975 0.024 0.001
x(2)t 0.990 0.007 0.002
x(3)t 0.996 0.001 0.002
x(4)t 0.998 0.000 0.001
x(5)t 0.998 0.001 0.001
x(6)t 0.997 0.003 0.000
x(7)t 0.994 0.006 0.000
x(8)t 0.991 0.009 0.000
x(9)t 0.987 0.012 0.000
x(10)t 0.983 0.016 0.001
x(11)t 0.979 0.019 0.002
x(12)t 0.975 0.022 0.003
Table A.1: Variance decomposition of higher order expectation in terms of their
first three principal components (level, slope, and curvature). I compute the values
in each row by projecting a simulated time series of higher order expectations onto
the three time series of component scores for the level, slope and curvature factors.
Each variance share is the square of the regression coefficient multiplied by the ratio
of the factor variance to the variance of the higher order expectation. The length
of the simulated sample is 1,000,000 observations with τ = 8 and k¯ = 12. The
t-statistics for the first stage regression are unanimously greater than one hundred,
even after correcting the residuals for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, so I
do not report them.
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B.1 Value Functions
B.1.1 Type I & II Agents with γ > 1 or ϑ < +∞
Full Policy Functions
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ
1− β −
( β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
)2 σ2x
2ϑ
−( 1
1− β
)2 σ2c
2ϑ
− ϑ log
(
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
))
αc =
1
1− β
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
No Short-Run Risk
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ+ 1
2
σ2c
1− β −
( β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
)2 σ2x
2ϑ
−
ϑ log
(
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
))
αc =
1
1− β
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
No Long-Run Risk
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ
1− β −
( 1
1− β
)2 σ2c
2ϑ
− ϑ log
(
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
))
αc =
1
1− β
106
No Disasters
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ+ pid log(1− b)
1− β −
( β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
)2 σ2x
2ϑ
−
( 1
1− β
)2 σ2c
2ϑ
)
αc =
1
1− β
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
No Risk
α0 =
β
(1− β)2
(
µ+
1
2
σ2c + pid log(1− b)
)
αc =
1
1− β
B.1.2 Type I & II Agents with γ = 1 or ϑ = +∞
No Short-Run Risk
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ+ ϕc
1− β + limϑ→∞ log
((
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
)−ϑ))
αc =
1
1− β
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
No Long-Run Risks
α0 =
β
1− β
(
µ+ ϕx
1− β + limϑ→∞ log
((
1− pid + pid(1− b)−
1
(1−β)ϑ
)−ϑ))
αc =
1
1− β
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No Disasters
α0 =
β(µ+ pid log(1− b))
(1− β)2
αc =
1
1− β
αx =
β
(1− βρ)(1− β)
No Risk
α0 =
β(µ+ ϕ)
(1− β)2
αc =
1
1− β
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B.2 Derivations
B.2.1 Derivation of the Distortion
mˆt+1(st+1) =
exp(−VII(st+1)/ϑ)
Et[exp(−VII(st+1)/ϑ)]
=
exp(−α0
ϑ
− αc
ϑ
ct+1 − αxϑ xt+1)
Et[exp(−α0ϑ − αcϑ ct+1 − αxϑ xt+1)]
=
exp(−α0
ϑ
− αc
ϑ
(µ+ ct + xt + ε
c
t+1 + ε
d
t+1)− αxϑ (ρxt + εxt+1))
Et[exp(−α0ϑ − αcϑ (µ+ ct + xt + εct+1 + εdt+1)− αxϑ (ρxt + εxt+1))]
=
exp(−α0
ϑ
− αc
ϑ
µ− αc
ϑ
ct − (αcϑ + αxρϑ )xt − αcϑ εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1))
Et[exp(−α0ϑ − αcϑ µ− αcϑ ct − (αcϑ + αxρϑ )xt − αcϑ εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1))]
=
exp(−αc
ϑ
εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1))
Et[exp(−αcϑ εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1))]
=
exp(−αc
ϑ
εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1)
exp(α
2
cσ
2
c
2ϑ2
)(1− pid + pid(1− b)−αcϑ ) exp(α2xσ2x2ϑ2 )
B.2.2 Worst-Case Distribution
Individually, the probability distributions of shocks are,
fd(εdt+1) = pi
εdt+1
log(1−b)
d (1− pid)1−
εdt+1
log(1−b)
f c(εct+1) =
1√
2piσc
e
− (ε
c
t+1)
2
2σ2c
fx(εxt+1) =
1√
2piσx
e
− (ε
x
t+1)
2
2σ2x .
By independence, the joint distribution is the product of the marginals,
f ε(εt+1) = f
d(εdt+1)f
c(εct+1)f
x(εxt+1)
= pi
εdt+1
log(1−b)
d (1− pid)1−
εdt+1
log(1−b)
1
2piσcσx
e
− (ε
c
t+1)
2
2σ2c
− (ε
x
t+1)
2
2σ2x .
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The distortion,
mˆt+1(εt+1) =
exp
(
− 1
ϑ(1−β)ε
c
t+1 − 1ϑ(1−β)εdt+1 − βϑ(1−βρ)(1−β)εxt+1
)
exp
(
1
(1−β)2
σ2c
2ϑ
)(
pid + (1− pid)(1− b)−
1
ϑ(1−β)
)
exp
((
β
(1−βρ)(1−β)
)2
σ2x
2ϑ
)
∝ exp
(
− 1
ϑ(1− β)ε
c
t+1 −
1
ϑ(1− β)ε
d
t+1 −
β
ϑ(1− βρ)(1− β)ε
x
t+1
)
The worst-case distribution,
f˜ ε(εt+1) ∝ mt+1(εt+1)f ε(εt+1).
This evaluates to,
f˜ ε(εt+1) ∝
(
e−
log(1−b)
ϑ(1−β) pid
) εdt+1
log(1−b)
(
1− pid
)1− εdt+1
log(1−b) 1
2piσcσx
e
−
(
εct+1+
σ2c
ϑ(1−β)
)2
2σ2c
−
(
εxt+1+
βσ2x
ϑ(1−βρ)(1−β)
)2
2σ2x
= (p˜id)
εdt+1
log(1−b) (1− p˜id)1−
εdt+1
log(1−b)
1
2piσcσx
e
−
(
εct+1+
σ2c
ϑ(1−β)
)2
2σ2c
−
(
εxt+1+
βσ2x
ϑ(1−βρ)(1−β)
)2
2σ2x
B.2.3 Model-Detection Error Probabilities
The approximating model (3.1)-(3.2) can be thought of as a vector autoregression
(VAR),
ct+1
xt+1
 =
µ
0
+
1 1
0 ρ

ct
xt
+
1 1 0
0 0 1


εdt+1
εct+1
εxt+1
 .
The worst-case distribution is,
ct+1
xt+1
 =
µ
0
+
1 1
0 ρ

ct
xt
+
1 1 0
0 0 1



ε˜dt+1
ε˜ct+1
εxt+1
+

wdt+1
wct+1
wxt+1

 ,
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where ε˜t+1 is a shock with the same distribution as εt+1 and wt+1 the mean of the
worst-case distribution. This simplifies to,ct+1
xt+1
 =
µ+ p˜i log(1− b)− σ2cϑ(1−β)
− βσ2x
ϑ(1−βρ)(1−β)
+
1 1
0 ρ

ct
xt
+
1 1 0
0 0 1


ε˜dt+1
ε˜ct+1
ε˜xt+1
 .
Now, we can re-think of this as a Markov-switching VAR with Normal shocks and
a hidden disaster state,ct+1
xt+1
 = µ˜(εdt+1) +
1 1
0 ρ

ct
xt
+
1 0
0 1

ε˜ct+1
ε˜xt+1
 ,
where,
µ˜(εdt+1) =
µ+ p˜i log(1− b)− σ2cϑ(1−β) + εdt+1
− βσ2x
ϑ(1−βρ)(1−β)
 .
B.2.4 Risk-Free Rate
1
rft
= Et[Λt,t+1]
= Et
[
β
Ct
Ct+1
exp(−VI(st+1)/ϑ)
Et[exp(−VI(st+1)/ϑ)]
]
= Et
[
β
exp(ct)
exp(ct+1)
exp(−αc
ϑ
εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1)
exp(α
2
cσ
2
c
2ϑ2
)(1− pid + pid(1− b)−αcϑ ) exp(α2xσ2x2ϑ2 )
]
= Et
[
β
exp(µ+ xt + εdt+1 + ε
c
t+1)
exp(−αc
ϑ
εct+1 − αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1)
exp(α
2
cσ
2
c
2ϑ2
)(1− pid + pid(1− b)−αcϑ ) exp(α2xσ2x2ϑ2 )
]
= Et
[
β
exp(µ+ xt)
exp(− (1+ϑ)αc
ϑ
εct+1 − (1+ϑ)αcϑ εdt+1 − αxϑ εxt+1)
exp(α
2
cσ
2
c
2ϑ2
)(1− pid + pid(1− b)−αcϑ ) exp(α2xσ2x2ϑ2 )
]
=
β
exp(µ+ xt)
exp
((
(1 + ϑ)2 − 1
)α2cσ2c
2ϑ2
)(1− pid + pid(1− b)− (1+ϑ)αcϑ )
(1− pid + pid(1− b)−αcϑ )
=
β
exp(µ+ xt)
exp
((
(1 + ϑ)2 − 1
)α2cσ2c
2ϑ2
)
ϕd
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C.1 Equilibrium Equations
Vt =
((
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βegt(1−1/ψ)R1−1/ψt
) 1
1−1/ψ
R1−γt = Et
[
V 1−γt+1
]
yt = ct + it + bt − e
gtbt+1
1 + ert
+
ϕb
2
(
bt+1 − b
)2
egtkt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it − ϕk
2
(
egtkt+1
kt
− eµg
)2
kt
Λt,t+1 = βe
−gt/ψλt+1
λt
·
(
Rt
Vt+1
)γ−1/ψ
λt = V
1/ψ
t
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)−1/ψ
λtwt = V
1/ψ
t h
ν−1
t
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)−1/ψ
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
1
ϕb(bt+1 − b) + egt/1+ert
)]
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
ϕk
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1− δ + ϕk
2
((
egt+1kt+2
kt+1
)2
− e2µg
))
− ϕk
(
egtkt+1
kt
− eµg
)]
yt = e
ztkϕkt (e
gtht)
ϕh
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt + [news]
t+τ
t
σzt = (1− ρσz)µσ
z
+ ρσzσ
z
t−1 + η
σzεσ
z
t ,
gt = (1− ρg)µg + ρggt−1 + ηgεgt
rt = ρrε
r
t−1 + e
σrt εrt + [news]
t+τ
t
σrt = (1− ρσr)µσ
r
+ ρσrσ
r
t−1 + η
σrεσ
r
t
ert = er¯ + εrt
σnt = (1− ρσn)µσ
n
+ ρσnσ
n
t−1 + η
σnεσ
n
t
[news]t+τt = e
σnt εnt
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C.2 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {Vt,Rt, ct, ht, it, kt, bt}∞t=0 and prices
{rt}∞t=0 such that in every period:
1. Given prices, the representative household solves its utility maximization
problem.
2. Given prices, the representative firm maximizes profits.
3. All resource constraints and laws of motions bind.
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C.3 Impulse Response Functions
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C.3.1 Household’s Problem with Recursive Preferences
The notation Vt = V (kt, bt, εt, newst) represents the following optimization prob-
lem,
V (kt, bt, newst) = (C.1)
max
ct,ht,it,bt+1
((
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βegt(1−1/ψ)Et
[
V (kt+1, bt+1, newst+1)1−γ
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
subject to,
yt = ct + it + bt − e
gtbt+1
1 + ert
+
ϕb
2
(
bt+1 − b
)2
with contemporaneous shocks εt and newst,
εt =

εgt
εzt
εσ
z
t
εrt
εσ
r
t

(C.2)
newst =

eσ
n
t+8εnt+8
eσ
n
t+7εnt+7
eσ
n
t+6εnt+6
eσ
n
t+5εnt+5
eσ
n
t+4εnt+4
eσ
n
t+3εnt+3
eσ
n
t+2εnt+2
eσ
n
t+1εnt+1
eσ
n
t εnt

, (C.3)
given all other laws of motion and the firm’s production function.
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C.3.2 Stationarity
Define the function Vt as the stationary utility function,
Vt =
1
Γt−1
Vt. (C.4)
The analytic form of Vt follows,
Vt =
((
Ct − Γt−1 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ β
[
V1−γt+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
=
((
Γt−1ct − Γt−1 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βEt
[
V1−γt+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
=
(
Γ
1−1/ψ
t−1
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βEt
[
Γ1−γt V
1−γ
t+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
=
(
Γ
1−1/ψ
t−1
(
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βΓ
1−1/ψ
t Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
= Γt−1
((
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βegt(1−1/ψ)Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
= Γt−1Vt.
Hence,
Vt =
((
ct − 1
ν
hνt
)1−1/ψ
+ βegt(1−1/ψ)Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
) 1
1−1/ψ
. (C.5)
C.4 Stochastic Discount Factor
Define a generalized stochastic discount factor as,
Λt,t+1 =
∂Vt/∂ct+1
∂Vt/∂ct
. (C.6)
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Then,
∂Vt
∂ct
=
(
u(ct, ht)
1−1/ψ + βegt(1−1/ψ)R1−1/ψt
) 1/ψ
1−1/ψ
u(ct, ht)
−1/ψuc(ct, ht)
= V
1/ψ
t u(ct, ht)
−1/ψuc(ct, ht)
∂Vt
∂ct+1
= βegt(1−1/ψ)V
1/ψ
t Rγ−1/ψt V 1/ψ−γt+1 u(ct+1, ht+1)−1/ψuc(ct+1, ht+1)
And dividing the two resulting equations yields,
Λt,t+1 =
∂Vt/∂ct+1
∂Vt/∂ct
(C.7)
= βegt(1−1/ψ)
V
1/ψ
t Rγ−1/ψt V 1/ψ−γt+1 u(ct+1, ht+1)−1/ψuc(ct+1, ht+1)
V
1/ψ
t u(ct, ht)
−1/ψuc(ct, ht)
= βegt(1−1/ψ)
(
u(ct+1, ht+1)
u(ct, ht)
)−1/ψ(
uc(ct+1, ht+1)
uc(ct, ht)
)( Rt
Vt+1
)γ−1/ψ
(C.8)
Substituting in the analytic form of preferences,
Λt,t+1 = βe
gt(1−1/ψ)
(
ct+1 − 1νhνt+1
ct − 1νhνt
)−1/ψ( Rt
Vt+1
)γ−1/ψ
.
Do note that in the paper the stochastic discount factor is scaled by egt because
this simplifies the presentation of the Euler equations.
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